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1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	LUIS MARIANO MARTINEZ, :
4	Petitioner :
5	v. : No. 10-1001
6	CHARLES L. RYAN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA:
7	DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS :
8	x
9	Washington, D.C.
10	Tuesday, October 4, 2011
11	
12	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
13	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
14	at 11:05 a.m.
15	APPEARANCES:
16	ROBERT D. BARTELS, ESQ., Tempe, Arizona; on behalf of
17	Petitioner.
18	KENT E. CATTANI, ESQ., Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals,
19	Phoenix, Arizona; on behalf of Respondent.
20	JEFFREY B. WALL, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor
21	General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on
22	behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae,
23	supporting Respondent.
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1	CONTENTS	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	ROBERT D. BARTELS, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioner	3
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
6	KENT E. CATTANI, ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the Respondent	24
8	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
9	JEFFREY B. WALL, ESQ.	
10	On behalf of the United States, as	42
11	amicus curiae, supporting Respondent	
12	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
13	ROBERT D. BARTELS, ESQ.	
14	On behalf of the Petitioner	51
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

Т	PROCEEDINGS
2	(11:05 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear
4	case next in Case 10-1001, Martinez v. Ryan.
5	Mr. Bartels.
6	ORAL ARGUMENT OF ROBERT BARTELS
7	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
8	MR. BARTELS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
9	please the Court:
L O	In Arizona almost all State and Federal
L1	claims for relief from a criminal conviction are
L 2	raisable in the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct
L3	appeal.
L 4	However, a claim that trial counsel was
L5	ineffective must be presented first to a trial court in
L 6	what Arizona labels a post-conviction relief proceeding.
L7	Petitioner agrees entirely with Arizona's
L8	requirement that ineffective assistance of trial counsel
L9	claims go initially to a trial court, and he does not
20	object to the label "post-conviction relief" as such.
21	The issue in the case has to do with
22	Arizona's insistence that Petitioner had no right to
23	counsel with respect to the post-conviction first-tier
24	review, portion of first-tier review, even though he did
25	have a right to counsel in the appeal portion of direct

- 1 review.
- 2 And our position is that that distinction
- 3 between what are two portions of the first opportunity
- 4 for review of a conviction, broken up sensibly but by
- 5 dictate of the State into two parts, that that
- 6 distinction cannot stand, especially in a case in which
- 7 the first post-conviction proceeding started and ended
- 8 before anything of substance happened in this --
- 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: If your main position is
- 10 right, then wouldn't the same go for 2255 proceedings?
- 11 I mean, this Court has said it makes sense to have the
- 12 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel looked at by
- 13 a trial judge first, not an appellate judge, and yet in
- 14 2255 proceedings, if you are urging ineffective
- 15 assistance of counsel, you don't get an automatic right
- 16 to counsel. In 2255 proceedings, counsel will be
- 17 appointed only if the court determines that the
- 18 interests of justice so require. So the proposition you
- 19 are urging would have ramifications in the Federal
- 20 system as well, wouldn't it?
- MR. BARTELS: That's correct, Your Honor.
- 22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And so 2255 would no
- 23 longer be the interests of justice so require because if
- 24 it's your first opportunity to raise the point the court
- 25 must appoint counsel for you. Is that your view?

- MR. BARTELS: In a situation -- The Federal
 system is a little more complicated than Arizona, but
 not much, because of Massaro.

 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Because of the what?

 MR. BARTELS: Our position would be in the
 Federal system, if a Federal defendant wished to file a
- 7 2255, that he would be entitled to appointed counsel,
- 8 but as far as this case is concerned, only with respect
- 9 to any claim of ineffective assistance at trial.
- 10 JUSTICE ALITO: Do you want us to hold that
- 11 there is a right to counsel whenever a Petitioner
- 12 asserts a claim that could not have been asserted at an
- 13 earlier point in the proceedings?
- MR. BARTELS: Yes, Your Honor, with the
- 15 caveat, if the State allows that kind of proceeding.
- 16 One of the things I have a hard time keeping track of in
- 17 this context is, unlike the right to counsel at trial,
- 18 the Sixth Amendment right, where I think they have to
- 19 give him a trial, we are dealing in a context where this
- 20 Court made clear well over 100 years ago that there
- 21 doesn't have to be any review at all. The State --
- JUSTICE ALITO: That's a very far-reaching
- 23 proposition that extends well beyond claims of
- 24 ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, wouldn't it?
- MR. BARTELS: Yes.

- 1 JUSTICE ALITO: If many years after someone
- 2 is convicted an allegation is made that the prosecution
- 3 failed to turn over exculpatory evidence and that the
- 4 information supporting the claim has just recently come
- 5 to light and could not have been previously discovered,
- 6 there would be a right to counsel there; wouldn't that
- 7 be the case?
- 8 MR. BARTELS: If the State -- if the State
- 9 provided that proceeding, that -- then the State would
- 10 not have to. The State could have statutes of
- 11 limitation or rules against excessive petitions that
- 12 could be extremely strict if they are concerned about
- 13 that.
- 14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why would it be excessive
- if it could not have been raised earlier?
- 16 MR. BARTELS: Your Honor, as I understand
- 17 the situation, we've got newly discovered evidence of
- 18 perhaps a Brady violation. In that situation, if the
- 19 State provides a proceeding for review of that, and it
- 20 is the first opportunity for review, I think the
- 21 implication of Douglas and Halbert is -- there would be
- 22 a right to --
- 23 JUSTICE SCALIA: What if the State doesn't
- 24 but the Federal government does? I mean, what if you
- 25 say, there is no State habeas available; you go straight

- 1 to Federal habeas?
- 2 MR. BARTELS: I think that's correct, Your
- 3 Honor. In the Federal system --
- 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: So you haven't really given
- 5 us a solution for the States. They can't -- they can't
- 6 stop this thing. Right?
- 7 MR. BARTELS: Well, but the Federal system
- 8 itself has a statute of limitation, though I believe
- 9 that the statute would probably begin to run, in Justice
- 10 Alito's hypothetical, with the discovery of a Brady
- 11 violation. So the Federal courts have set up the
- 12 statute of limitations to accommodate that point. And
- 13 the States would be free to do that, too, if they wish.
- 14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: If you permitted this
- 15 counsel to raise a claim that could not have been raised
- 16 on the direct appeal, is the counsel limited to that
- 17 point, or can the counsel representing the client bring
- 18 up other things?
- 19 MR. BARTELS: No, Your Honor. The right to
- 20 counsel would apply only to the first-tier review issue.
- 21 And so, for example, if counsel finds other issues and
- 22 wants to pursue them, the State could say: We're not
- 23 going to pay you for those.
- 24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But could it be that the
- 25 counsel could also bring up a Brady claim, a newly

- 1 discovered evidence? It wouldn't be limited to
- 2 ineffective assistance of counsel?
- 3 MR. BARTELS: The holding in this case won't
- 4 be so limited, but I would agree that Douglas and
- 5 Halbert would imply that Brady, at least many Brady
- 6 claims, would be such that the 2255 or the State post-
- 7 conviction would be the first opportunity to present.
- JUSTICE ALITO: What if the -- I'm sorry.
- 9 What if the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
- 10 closely related to other claims that Petitioner wants to
- 11 raise in an initial post-conviction relief proceeding?
- 12 Counsel at trial was ineffective for failing to do A, B,
- 13 C and D, and all of those are bases for relief. And now
- 14 I want to argue with new counsel in the first post-
- 15 conviction proceeding not only that counsel was
- 16 ineffective at trial, but also that all these other
- 17 claims are meritorious.
- 18 Are you saying that the counsel to whom the
- 19 Petitioner has a right is limited to making only the
- 20 ineffective assistance of counsel claim and cannot go on
- 21 and represent the Petitioner on these other claims?
- MR. BARTELS: I'm saying, Your Honor, that
- 23 the State does not have any duty to pay the lawyer in
- 24 those circumstances.
- Now, the kind of situation you are talking

- 1 about I think is most likely to come up where --
- 2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: It's not a question of
- 3 pay. I think Justice Alito was asking, counsel says:
- 4 I've got a duty to represent my client zealously, so I
- 5 want to bring up not only ineffective assistance of
- 6 counsel, but these other matters.
- 7 MR. BARTELS: Your Honor, I think the
- 8 appointment could be limited to the first-tier review.
- 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry. I don't
- 10 understand how that works. The claim is, say for
- 11 example, you were ineffective because you didn't raise a
- 12 Batson claim. Surely he gets to review the Batson claim
- once he establishes the effectiveness --
- MR. BARTELS: Yes, Your Honor, and in fact
- 15 in that example pursuing the ineffective assistance
- 16 claim requires pursuing the Batson claim.
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So the lawyer -- the
- 18 State would be required to provide counsel not simply to
- 19 raise the threshold ineffectiveness argument, but to go
- 20 ahead and raise the arguments as to which he was
- 21 ineffective.
- MR. BARTELS: Well, Your Honor, in the
- 23 situation in which the ineffectiveness of counsel is
- 24 based on the failure to make a Batson claim, the failure
- 25 to make an objection at trial, I would agree with you,

- 1 absolutely.
- 2 In my experience --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: What about other claims
- 4 that don't follow on? I mean, other claimed errors in
- 5 the trial? You say the State doesn't have to pay for
- 6 that representation. Does counsel keep time sheets
- 7 on --
- 8 MR. BARTELS: Yes, Your Honor.
- 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- on the various issues,
- 10 12-minute intervals?
- MR. BARTELS: Yes, Your Honor.
- 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: And the State pays for some
- issues and not for other issues?
- 14 MR. BARTELS: Absolutely, Your Honor. It
- 15 happens routinely in the State system. The appointed
- 16 counsel have to submit detailed billing statements.
- 17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How does this work now,
- 18 counsel? How are you proposing this work? Right now in
- 19 the Federal system a pro se litigant comes in and says:
- 20 I have an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Most
- 21 district courts say, ask the attorney to submit an
- 22 affidavit, and then decides whether on the face of the
- 23 claims there is reason to appoint counsel and hold a
- 24 hearing. Under your theory, every State would be
- 25 obligated to appoint counsel ab initio to check out

- 1 whether there is the potential for an IAC claim?
- 2 MR. BARTELS: Well, I think the States could
- 3 run this in different ways. The way in which Arizona
- 4 does it makes sense to me, which is that the -- there is
- 5 a form, Form 24-B. It's a very simple form. It doesn't
- 6 require stating any substantive grounds. It really just
- 7 says: I would like to challenge my conviction through
- 8 post-conviction relief, in the very same way that
- 9 notices of appeal --
- 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what you are
- 11 essentially saying, every State is obligated to appoint
- 12 an attorney on the first leg?
- MR. BARTELS: Every State is obligated to
- 14 treat these, what are really parts of the appeal, the
- 15 initial appeal, the same way they do the rest of the --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, there is a huge
- 17 reliance interest that has developed since Finley and
- 18 its progeny, and States don't routinely appoint
- 19 post-conviction counsel.
- MR. BARTELS: I --
- 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What are we going to do
- 22 about that reliance interest and the burdens on States?
- 23 MR. BARTELS: Well, Your Honor, I -- I guess
- 24 I would say two things about that. One, there are a
- 25 fair number of States that do appoint counsel routinely

- 1 on request. Arizona is one.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, I know -- I know
- 3 for a fact that most do in capital cases. But I don't
- 4 know if that's the same figure for non-capital cases.
- 5 MR. BARTELS: I don't know the percentage,
- 6 Your Honor, but I know there are several States.
- 7 JUSTICE BREYER: I don't understand. Could
- 8 you answer the original question that Justice Sotomayor
- 9 asked? She said: What happens in Arizona? You said a
- 10 prisoner, or defendant, he has been convicted, gone
- 11 through his first round of appeal. He is given a form,
- 12 which you said was a simple form, do you want to proceed
- in collateral review? And he answers yes. Then does
- 14 Arizona appoint a lawyer or not?
- MR. BARTELS: Yes.
- 16 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. Then what are
- 17 we arguing about? He had his lawyer.
- 18 MR. BARTELS: He didn't have an effective
- 19 lawyer.
- JUSTICE BREYER: Ah, so now you are talking
- 21 about the second round. You are talking about does he
- 22 have a right to a lawyer when he wants to claim that the
- 23 first lawyer that they gave him on collateral review was
- 24 ineffective?
- MR. BARTELS: No, Your Honor, that is not

- 1 the issue in this case.
- JUSTICE BREYER: What is the issue?
- 3 MR. BARTELS: The issue in this case is
- 4 whether the ineffectiveness of the first post-conviction
- 5 counsel constitutes cause to excuse the --
- 6 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. So why --
- 7 that's what I thought, actually; and I don't understand
- 8 what all the briefs are about, and I must be missing
- 9 something, about whether they are all going to have to
- 10 appoint lawyers or not in these different States. It
- 11 seems to me that has nothing to do with this case.
- 12 This case comes out of a State that does
- 13 appoint lawyers and the question is whether you, your
- 14 client, should have from your point of view at least one
- 15 full, effective chance to say, every lawyer I have been
- 16 appointed, I've gotten 100 and they are all terrible,
- 17 and -- or whether the State can block that from being
- 18 heard in habeas, by saying, oh, no, we gave him 19 and
- 19 the claim that all 19 were ineffective, he can't even
- 20 raise. That's the issue, is that it?
- 21 MR. BARTELS: Well, Your Honor, we are
- 22 actually, once we take it past two, I -- I'm not on
- 23 board with the hypothetical.
- JUSTICE BREYER: No, no, no -- but I'm not
- 25 -- I'm not ridiculing as it sounded your claim. I'm

- 1 saying maybe that's right. Maybe he's not going to win
- 2 the claim, probably; but the question is, if his claim
- 3 is in Federal habeas, I have gotten 102 lawyers in 102
- 4 proceedings and every one of them was absolutely
- 5 ineffective, perhaps that habeas judge has to look at it
- 6 and say oh, I see, he's claiming he never had one full
- 7 effective chance to claim that his trial lawyer was
- 8 ineffective because the other 19 was just as bad -- I
- 9 have to look at it if I'm a trial judge.
- Now, that is not a silly argument in my
- 11 opinion; that could be a winning argument. I just want
- 12 to know is that basically your argument?
- MR. BARTELS: No, Your Honor.
- JUSTICE BREYER: Okay.
- 15 MR. BARTELS: That is not my argument.
- 16 JUSTICE BREYER: Now let's start at ground
- 17 zero, sorry. Everyone else --
- 18 (Laughter.)
- JUSTICE ALITO: Why isn't that where your
- 20 argument leads, to the proposition that you can never
- 21 procedurally default irrevocably an ineffective
- 22 assistance of counsel claim?
- MR. BARTELS: Well, Your Honor, on a
- 24 theoretical level, I don't think this Court's decisions
- 25 in Douglas and Ross and Halbert give us a clear answer

- 1 about whether there's a right to effective assistance of
- 2 second post-conviction counsel --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: But we want to know what
- 4 rule you are advocating in this case.
- 5 MR. BARTELS: I --
- 6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: We want to know why you
- 7 are not advocating for what Justice Breyer and Justice
- 8 Alito indicate is an endless right to claim that all
- 9 previous counsel were ineffective. You say oh, no, you
- 10 are not arguing that. What is the rule that you are
- 11 arguing for? What limiting principle do you have so
- 12 that we do not have an endless right of counsel?
- 13 MR. BARTELS: Well, Your Honor, the -- the
- 14 theory that you get counsel for first-tier review limits
- 15 it to that first tier, because when you go after the
- 16 effectiveness of the -- of the first post-conviction
- 17 counsel, that is necessarily going to involve review of
- 18 the effectiveness of trial counsel.
- 19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But -- I understand that.
- 20 But what is it that prevents the Petitioner from saying
- 21 that the first counsel in the collateral proceeding was
- ineffective and that so was the second?
- 23 MR. BARTELS: Your Honor, I don't think
- 24 there is a right to a counsel and therefore not a right
- 25 to effective counsel in the second --

- 1 JUSTICE BREYER: But you can -- you can have
- 2 a -- you don't have to give him a counsel. Look, the
- 3 State did give him a counsel on first collateral review;
- 4 that counsel was supposed to, according to him, raise
- 5 the claim, my trial counsel was no good.
- 6 Now we go to the next round. The State
- 7 says: I'm sorry, you are on your own here; we are not
- 8 giving you a lawyer anymore. Okay. That may count. He
- 9 now has to know he has to make the argument himself.
- 10 And therefore he goes and makes the argument himself,
- and now he's in habeas and he can argue they got it all
- 12 wrong. He's not blocked.
- MR. BARTELS: That's correct.
- JUSTICE BREYER: All right. So what --
- 15 there isn't an issue in this case about giving people
- 16 counsel, on that view. There is an issue about if you
- do give them counsel, then they have to be able to have
- 18 an argument later that you did it ineffectively. That's
- 19 a different matter; that's a question of whether you are
- 20 blocked in habeas and can't even make the claim.
- 21 All right, forget it. I will ask the other.
- MR. BARTELS: Well, Your Honor, I think I'm
- 23 on the same page with that example.
- JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah, okay.
- JUSTICE ALITO: But there can't be a

- 1 claim --
- 2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Can I leave this argument
- 3 with the judgment that you have offered me no limiting
- 4 principle on how many proceedings there must be --
- 5 MR. BARTELS: Well --
- 6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- before there's an end
- 7 to the argument that previous counsel were inadequate?
- I understand, this is the -- in this case it
- 9 was the first counsel in -- in the first collateral
- 10 proceeding that we are talking about. But why couldn't
- 11 it be the second? You don't give us a limiting
- 12 principle.
- MR. BARTELS: Well, Your Honor --
- 14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And if you want to say
- there shouldn't be, then that's fine.
- 16 MR. BARTELS: No, Your Honor, there
- 17 shouldn't. And the merits -- the Petitioner's merits
- 18 brief devoted quite a few pages to both the theoretical
- 19 problems with the infinite continuing of litigation and
- 20 the practical limitations.
- 21 And let me -- let me turn to the practical
- 22 ones.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: So Mr. Bartels, before you
- 24 do that, I mean, I understood you to be saying that you
- 25 would draw a line after the first post-conviction

- 1 proceeding; is that correct?
- MR. BARTELS: Yes, that's correct.
- 3 JUSTICE KAGAN: And the briefs go back and
- 4 forth as to whether that line -- you know, what lies
- 5 behind that line. But you would draw the line there?
- 6 MR. BARTELS: Yes, Your Honor,
- 7 theoretically. And the State has the wherewithal, given
- 8 McKane, to draw the line anywhere it pleases. It could
- 9 just say you get one post-conviction.
- 10 JUSTICE ALITO: What I understand you to be
- 11 saying is exactly that. A line has to be drawn
- 12 somewhere; enough is enough; it can't go on forever.
- MR. BARTELS: Yes.
- 14 JUSTICE ALITO: And the sensible place to
- 15 draw the line in your view is after the first-tier
- 16 review; that's your argument, right?
- 17 MR. BARTELS: Yes, Your Honor, because I --
- 18 JUSTICE ALITO: The problem with that is you
- 19 can answer that by saying: Yes, we have to draw a line
- 20 someplace and the Court has already done that, and it
- 21 did it in Douglas and it was after first tier of review
- 22 on direct appeal. It's exactly the same argument,
- 23 except where the law stands now the line is drawn at a
- 24 different place on the same principle. It has to be
- 25 drawn someplace.

- 1 MR. BARTELS: Well, Your Honor, that
- 2 principle doesn't work very well in a system like
- 3 Arizona's where you can't bring this one claim on the
- 4 direct appeal, and you can -- and Mr. Martinez, well,
- 5 couldn't -- you can file your first post-conviction and
- 6 litigate it while the appeal is pending before it's
- 7 final.
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So you would be
- 9 happy with a system that said, no, you don't have to
- 10 raise it in collateral review, you have to raise it on
- 11 direct appeal, which is very unworkable, because if you
- 12 are arguing ineffective assistance of counsel in a
- direct proceeding, presumably it's usually the same
- 14 counsel; he's not likely to bring the claim. That would
- 15 be worse for criminal defendants than the system --
- MR. BARTELS: Well --
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- that's there now.
- MR. BARTELS: No, Your Honor. The -- if
- 19 direct appeal is now going to encompass possible claims
- 20 of ineffective assistance, you are not going to be able
- 21 to have the same counsel on appeal.
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but the person
- 23 who decides what arguments you are going to make on
- 24 appeal is usually the person who handled the trial in
- 25 these types of cases.

- 1 MR. BARTELS: Well, Your Honor, that's not
- 2 true in Arizona.
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: In Arizona, the
- 4 usual case in criminal cases is that somebody else
- 5 handles the appeal on direct proceedings?
- 6 MR. BARTELS: It may be from the same
- 7 office. But I agree that that would have to change if
- 8 ineffective assistance of counsel were part of the
- 9 direct appeal.
- 10 And the other thing that would have to be
- 11 done -- and this is done in some States -- is that you
- 12 have to raise it in direct appeal, but most -- as this
- 13 Court recognized in Massaro -- most ineffective
- 14 assistance claims cannot be dealt with on direct appeal
- 15 because of a lack of evidence. They need more evidence.
- 16 JUSTICE SCALTA: Ineffective assistance of
- 17 appellate counsel certainly can't be dealt with on
- 18 direct appeal; right?
- MR. BARTELS: No, that's correct.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: So even if you get a
- 21 different counsel to -- to take the appeal, you could
- 22 always claim that that counsel was ineffective in
- 23 habeas, right?
- MR. BARTELS: Your Honor, I -- two things
- 25 about that. First of all, the State does not have to

- 1 provide the review of the effectiveness of appellate
- 2 counsel. If it does so, I would still say that that's
- 3 going to end up having to be second opportunity review
- 4 of the claims that appellate counsel failed to raise.
- 5 That's got to be the basis for --
- 6 JUSTICE ALITO: If there is a right to
- 7 counsel whenever someone asserts a claim that couldn't
- 8 have been raised earlier, why does the State not have
- 9 the obligation to provide counsel to contest the
- 10 constitutionality of the representation that was
- 11 provided on appeal?
- MR. BARTELS: Well, Your Honor, the -- the
- 13 reason is that -- in terms of this first tier, second
- 14 tier analysis from Douglas and Halbert, you are not
- 15 going to be able to look at the effectiveness of
- 16 appellate counsel without looking at the issue of
- 17 prejudice. And that's going to require what is second
- 18 opportunity review of the merits of the claim that the
- 19 appellate lawyer didn't raise. But that's the second
- 20 opportunity for that review, because the direct appeal
- 21 was the first opportunity.
- I think in the end, though, just a Mathews
- 23 v. Eldridge procedural due process analysis works
- 24 better. And the critical factor is what's the risk of
- 25 an error in the absence of counsel?

- 1 Well, the first time around, the risk of
- 2 your -- involves the probability that the trial judge
- 3 made a mistake that's prejudicial. By the time we get
- 4 to the post-conviction challenging appellate counsel's
- 5 effectiveness, now it's the probability that the trial
- 6 judge was wrong and that the appellate lawyer was wrong.
- 7 And so it's exponentially lower -- that at least
- 8 provides a basis for --
- 9 JUSTICE ALITO: A trial judge doesn't have
- 10 to be wrong for there to be ineffective assistance of
- 11 counsel claim at trial?
- MR. BARTELS: No. No. I'm sticking with
- 13 the example of ineffective assistance of appellate
- 14 counsel. Trial counsel -- I'm sorry.
- 15 JUSTICE KAGAN: I was wondering what you
- 16 would say -- some of these statistics is just that these
- 17 claims succeed very, very rarely. So by the analysis
- 18 that you just used, this kind of balancing analysis, why
- 19 we should even go so far as you would have us go?
- 20 MR. BARTELS: Well, Your Honor, it would be
- 21 because Douglas and Halbert have done that balancing in
- 22 saying that in this situation, the first tier review,
- 23 the probability of an incorrect result without counsel
- 24 is sufficiently high that there should be counsel. And
- 25 that's really the disagreement between Justice Douglas

- 1 and Justice Harlan in Douglas. Justice Harlan didn't
- 2 think the lawyers mattered --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: So the -- post-conviction
- 4 application would go to the trial judge; right? And on
- 5 the --
- 6 MR. BARTELS: Yes, Your Honor.
- 7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So both in the trial
- 8 judge with this Anders type speech that doesn't raise
- 9 ineffective assistance of counsel, but it's such an
- 10 obvious claim to make that when the -- when the judge
- 11 reviews that brief, if the trial judge thought that this
- 12 defendant was abysmally represented, wouldn't --
- 13 wouldn't the Court say, sorry, I'm not going to accept
- 14 this Anders speech. It seems to me you -- there was
- 15 enslavement -- ineffective assistance of counsel, and
- 16 you should raise that. That's a viable issue, so I'm
- 17 not going to accept your briefs.
- 18 MR. BARTELS: I think there would be
- 19 something like that with the right to counsel for these
- 20 ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.
- 21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: If the judge reviews the
- 22 Anders review of ineffective assistance of counsel
- 23 claims, a valid one, the judge would have spotted these
- 24 issues, and it would have been -- it would have been
- 25 argued on that first --

- 1 MR. BARTELS: Are we talking about the
- 2 Martinez case itself?
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes. If -- in the
- 4 Martinez case, there was an Anders brief, right?
- 5 MR. BARTELS: There was, Your Honor, but it
- 6 was nothing but a summary of the trial transcript, and
- 7 provides no basis for the trial court -- the problem
- 8 with ineffective --
- 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Doesn't the trial court,
- 10 I mean the excuse -- the excuse of counsel is not
- 11 automatic, the trial judge has to look at it and say,
- 12 no, there is -- there's no issue for you to pursue, so
- 13 I'm going to excuse you.
- MR. BARTELS: Well, under the current
- 15 system, the trial judge has no duty to make any Anders
- 16 determination because the Arizona courts have upheld
- 17 there is no right to effective appointed counsel.
- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- Mr. Cattani?
- 20 ORAL ARGUMENT OF KENT E. CATTANI
- 21 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
- MR. CATTANI: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
- 23 please the Court:
- I would like to focus on three points.
- 25 First, petitioner is advocating a significant change to

- 1 this Court's jurisprudence that does implicate the
- 2 State's reliance interest on Finley and Giarratano.
- It's not a minor change --
- 4 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Cattani, can I ask about
- 5 your interests here, because your State is one that does
- 6 appoint counsel. So you already have the costs there.
- 7 I'm just wondering, in your brief, you talk a lot about
- 8 the excessive costs that this would impose on you. And
- 9 I'm just wondering where those costs come from if you
- 10 appoint counsel already. And I know some other States
- 11 are in a different situation, but as to you, where do
- 12 the costs come from?
- 13 MR. CATTANI: I think they come primarily
- 14 from the logical extension of the rule that would
- 15 require a second post-conviction proceeding to eliminate
- 16 the claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction
- 17 counsel. Right now, those claims are routinely rejected
- 18 under Finley and Giarratano because there is no
- 19 constitutional right to counsel. Under the theory
- 20 and -- I don't think there's really been advanced a
- 21 principled basis for limiting the rule that's been
- 22 advanced, and certainly --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, if we just said there
- 24 is, you know, we can only draw a line in this context
- 25 and we're going to draw the line here, and this is where

- 1 it sticks. What are the additional costs to you?
- 2 MR. CATTANI: The additional costs would be
- 3 implicated with a second post-conviction proceeding.
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, it's only a cost
- 5 if that second counsel, however its secured, can
- 6 actually make a credible or sustainable claim that
- 7 appellate counsel, the first tier counsel, was
- 8 ineffective.
- 9 MR. CATTANI: I think it's -- if the nature
- 10 of ineffective assistance claims, they are easy to raise
- 11 and difficult to litigate. It's -- it's not difficult
- 12 to raise -- to assert ineffective assistance. It's very
- obvious in capital cases where an assertion is my
- 14 attorney was ineffective at sentencing for failing to
- 15 raise --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Federal courts handle
- 17 them routinely.
- 18 MR. CATTANI: Pardon me?
- 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Federal courts handle
- them routinely on papers, and most of them are denied.
- 21 Is the State system different? Where first level
- 22 counsel, appellate counsel, post-conviction counsel
- 23 raises ineffective assistance of trial counsel. How
- 24 many of those cases end up in hearing?
- MR. CATTANI: I don't -- I don't have the

- 1 statistics. They do not generally result in -- in
- 2 evidentiary hearings.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Exactly. Very few.
- 4 MR. CATTANI: In noncapital cases.
- 5 Certainly in capital cases, I think the majority do.
- 6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Can I go back to just
- 7 clarify the record for a second? What authorized Levitt
- 8 to file the post-conviction relief motion? Wasn't he
- 9 appointed simply to prosecute the direct appeal?
- 10 MR. CATTANI: At hearing, Levitt was
- 11 appointed to prosecute the direct appeal.
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What gave him the
- 13 authority to file the 32 motion? Obviously, he didn't
- 14 seek his client's approval because the client when he
- 15 received it said: I don't understand what you are
- 16 saying; I only speak Spanish. So what gave Levitt the
- 17 authority to do what she did?
- MR. CATTANI: Well, she was representing
- 19 Emitz and Martinez, and the rules allow the filings of
- 20 both convictions petitions.
- 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: By an attorney appointed
- 22 just on the direct review?
- MR. CATTANI: Well, I don't think there is
- 24 anything that would prevent her from representing him in
- 25 a number of different ways. If she saw something that

- 1 she thought needed to be raised in a post --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what would have
- 3 been -- what was the tactical advantage of doing what
- 4 she did? What conceivable reason was there for her to
- 5 file the rule 32 motion before direct review finished?
- 6 MR. CATTANI: I don't know that there was
- 7 necessarily a tactical reason. The reason would be in
- 8 some cases that if an attorney views the case as having
- 9 a potentially meritorious issue on post conviction, you
- 10 get relief earlier.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, you know that she
- 12 didn't. So answer my question. What reason did Levitt
- 13 have, strategic or otherwise, to file the rule 32
- 14 motion?
- 15 MR. CATTANI: I don't know that she had one.
- 16 But there was some indication in the record that there
- 17 was some evidence that she wanted to raise an issue that
- 18 the victim's diary would have contained some exculpatory
- 19 information, and that would have been something that
- 20 would have had to have been developed in a post-
- 21 conviction brief.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But she files
- 23 essentially an Ander's brief that says: I don't see
- 24 anything. What was the strategic reason for doing that?
- 25 What conceivable strategic reason?

- 1 MR. CATTANI: If she thought that there
- 2 would be a claim, that after looking at it further,
- 3 decided that the claims were not tolerable is, I think,
- 4 what happened in this instance.
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is it routine, or
- 6 does it happen often that lawyers who perceive a trial
- 7 issue that can only be raised on collateral review to
- 8 think that it makes sense to raise that right away so
- 9 that the appeal -- and then the appeal is delayed until
- 10 that's resolved?
- 11 MR. CATTANI: It is what happened in
- 12 Arizona. Frequently, prior to the Spreitz decision.
- 13 And historically counsel was allowed -- counsel were
- 14 allowed to raise claims of ineffective assistance and
- 15 stay the appeal. And that was the practice previously.
- 16 So it is not necessarily unusual that an attorney
- 17 reviewing the record might decide that there are some
- 18 issues that could be raised in post conviction.
- 19 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. This is not --
- 20 We will say this is my argument. I don't want to make
- 21 this your friend's argument.
- In Arizona there was a trial, and the
- 23 defendant thinks trial counsel was inadequate. Then
- 24 there was a collateral review, and Arizona appoints a
- 25 lawyer for that. And after that, the Arizona courts

- 1 thought, no, he was adequate at trial. This particular
- 2 defendant wants to say that that lawyer was inadequate,
- 3 too. In fact, it was the same one. Hardly surprising.
- 4 That's his view. Now when he makes that argument in
- 5 Federal court, I guess he's going to be met with the
- 6 claim, since Arizona didn't have to appoint the lawyer
- 7 for collateral review, it doesn't matter what that
- 8 lawyer does. Is that right?
- 9 MR. CATTANI: Well, I think it's better
- 10 viewed through the lens of procedural due process. We
- 11 are looking at what are the procedures that are
- 12 available to a defendant to raise a claim of ineffective
- 13 assistance of trial counsel. One of the ways that you
- 14 can do that, that certainly goes a long way to
- 15 satisfying procedural due process, is appoint counsel.
- 16 It could be accomplished without appointing counsel,
- 17 certainly having somebody --
- JUSTICE BREYER: Don't guess where I'm going
- 19 here. Maybe nobody wants to go there. Just follow the
- 20 questions. The question is, if he tries to make the
- 21 claim he does, want to say that my first lawyer was no
- 22 good at trial, and my second lawyer, who by coincidence
- 23 was the same in the collateral proceeding, was no good
- 24 either, then the State comes in and says: You can't
- 25 make that argument now because we had a proceeding

- 1 called the collateral review proceeding; we didn't have
- 2 to give you a lawyer there. But even if that lawyer was
- 3 inadequate, you lose because we didn't have to give you
- 4 one. Am I right about that? That's all I want to know.
- 5 MR. CATTANI: Well, I think you're -- you're
- 6 not right from the standpoint that we do have to provide
- 7 procedural due process. And the question is whether
- 8 that was enough.
- JUSTICE BREYER: All right. You know. I'll
- 10 answer it. You say that is enough to give him a lawyer.
- 11 Okay? It is enough. But you have to give him an
- 12 adequate lawyer if you give him one. If you give him
- one. You don't have to give him one: But if you give
- 14 him one, it has to be adequate. Now what about that?
- 15 MR. CATTANI: Well, I think that goes well
- 16 beyond this Court's previous --
- 17 JUSTICE BREYER: But would that is done.
- 18 But that's where I think we are at. Now why not say
- 19 this, that every defendant has to have one fair shot at
- 20 claiming, they can make the claim that his trial lawyer
- 21 was inadequate. And the State doesn't have to give him
- 22 the lawyer at collateral review; but if it does, then
- 23 that lawyer, he can say, couldn't make that claim
- 24 because he was inadequate. So you say, fine, they can
- 25 make that argument in habeas. I bet they never win.

- 1 But somebody might. He can make it. So what would
- 2 happen would be that the habeas judge in Federal habeas
- 3 would read the piece of paper. He'd say: What's the
- 4 ground for thinking this, and then he would make his
- 5 normal kinds of judgments.
- 6 Now what is -- Is there anything wrong with
- 7 that view? Is it absolutely blocked by precedent? It
- 8 seems to me it would relieve the concerns of the states
- 9 about worrying about having to appoint a lot of lawyers,
- 10 and it gives him a fair shot to make his argument.
- 11 MR. CATTANI: I think it is blocked by
- 12 precedent, certainly by F and Giarratano.
- 13 JUSTICE BREYER: Because?
- 14 MR. CATTANI: The problem with just shifting
- 15 -- because this Court has said that there is no right to
- 16 counsel and thus no right to the effective assistance of
- 17 counsel, and --
- JUSTICE BREYER: Well, that's where you
- 19 would have to make the exception. You'd say: If you
- 20 give him a counsel, he does have the right to an
- 21 effective assistance of counsel insofar as the
- 22 ineffectiveness would prevent him from raising a claim
- 23 that to be fair the trial itself has to be -- he has to
- 24 have that about the trial itself. Without exception, it
- 25 would be that exception. Now is there something in

- 1 those cases that blocks that exception?
- 2 MR. CATTANI: Well, I think it does create
- 3 an infinite continuum.
- 4 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, in a sense it does,
- 5 but he's never going to win the infinite continuum.
- 6 MR. CATTANI: But the other problem with it
- 7 is --
- 8 JUSTICE BREYER: You never have to give him
- 9 a lawyer at all.
- 10 MR. CATTANI: That's correct, but if you
- 11 don't, then the problem is you shift over to Federal
- 12 court, and on Federal habeas you are then in the
- 13 position of litigating claims that are untethered to any
- 14 State court decision. And when we talk about whether
- 15 it's blocked by current precedent, certainly under
- 16 Edwards v. Carpenter to allege ineffective assistance as
- 17 cause to overcome a procedural default, there is a
- 18 requirement that you litigate that claim in State court.
- 19 JUSTICE ALITO: The question is whether
- 20 there is cause external to Petitioner to overcome
- 21 procedural default. If you went down that road, with
- 22 Petitioner representing himself or herself, not have to
- 23 show that: I would have raised a claim of ineffective
- 24 assistance of trial counsel and I would have won on that
- 25 were it not for the fact that the State appointed

- 1 counsel for me and led me astray and prevented me from
- 2 raising this meritorious argument. Isn't that where
- 3 that would have to go?
- 4 MR. CATTANI: Well, I think it would, but
- 5 it's even more problematic here in that the procedure is
- 6 that the attorney files a notice, gives a notice to the
- 7 defendant that she's been unable to find any tolerable
- 8 claims and gives the defendant an opportunity to file
- 9 his own pleading. So it's somewhat illogical to think
- 10 that if we just grant a second post-conviction
- 11 proceeding that the defendant is going to be in any
- 12 better position than he's in, in this type of situation
- 13 where he's advised that the attorney says that, as is
- 14 routinely the case, I am unable to find tolerable
- 15 claims, and then the defendant is given an opportunity
- 16 to file his own petition.
- 17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And how much time in the
- 18 procedure you described, when appointed counsel does
- 19 inform Martinez: I'm not bringing up any claims for
- 20 you, so if you want to pursue relief you have to do so
- 21 on your own.
- How much time does the defendant have? How
- 23 much time remains?
- 24 MR. CATTANI: I don't recall the specific
- 25 time. I believe it is in the brief. I'm sorry, I don't

- 1 recall the number of days that were remaining. But
- 2 certainly a defendant can request additional time if the
- 3 period of time is very short at that point. Extensions
- 4 are routinely granted in those circumstances.
- 5 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Cattani, if you handled
- 6 this through the regular appeals process, the person
- 7 would receive the benefit of counsel. Is that correct?
- 8 Rather than shuttle this over to the post-conviction
- 9 review process?
- 10 MR. CATTANI: Well the person --Here he
- 11 received the benefit of counsel because it's appointed
- 12 in Arizona. He receives the benefit of counsel. If
- 13 your question is: Would he be entitled to the effective
- 14 assistance of the attorney developing that record?
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes, exactly right.
- 16 MR. CATTANI: I don't think so necessarily.
- 17 I think that's a different. I think of the attack on
- 18 the effectiveness of collateral review of trial counsel
- 19 is itself a collateral attack. And I think under Finley
- 20 and Giarratano, and I think the distinction this Court
- 21 has drawn between direct review and collateral attack is
- 22 one that should be maintained. And in theory --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: But those -- those were --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Try --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- cases in which you

- 1 could not raise -- pardon me, in which you could raise
- 2 the particular issue at hand. But that's not this case.
- 3 MR. CATTANI: Well, I don't think it's
- 4 ever --
- 5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The question is whether or
- 6 not the rationale of those cases, which you state
- 7 correctly, is applicable to a different set of
- 8 circumstances.
- 9 MR. CATTANI: Well, I'm -- I'm not sure I'm
- 10 following, because I think the procedure that errs on
- 11 the following is -- is something that was in place at
- 12 the time of Finley and Giarratano. What -- what Arizona
- does is not extraordinary; it really follows what has
- 14 been recommended in Massaro, that -- that claims
- 15 relating to --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: But -- but those were,
- 17 correct me if I'm wrong, cases -- those were not cases
- in which the issue could only be raised on collateral.
- 19 MR. CATTANI: Well, I think in -- in Massaro
- 20 this Court noted that it -- it would be rare for any --
- 21 for any -- for a defendant to be entitled to relief on a
- 22 claim that could be raised on direct appeal.
- 23 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, Massaro indeed said
- there are good reasons for withdrawing this issue and
- 25 putting it in a different kind of process. So suppose

- 1 the State does this, and some States do it: they say on
- 2 -- in the direct appeal process, we are going to remand
- 3 this issue back to the trial court because the trial
- 4 court is going to be fast and can make an evaluation.
- 5 That's part of the direct appeal process, this -- this
- 6 remand. Would the person then be entitled to effective
- 7 assistance of counsel?
- 8 MR. CATTANI: That's -- it's a difficult
- 9 question. I -- I don't think they would, because I
- 10 think it's still a collateral proceeding to address the
- 11 -- the effectiveness of trial counsel.
- 12 JUSTICE KAGAN: Even though now it's part of
- 13 the regular appeals process. It's just the way --
- 14 because of the issues that we recognized in Massaro, the
- 15 State has decided to structure things in this way?
- 16 MR. CATTANI: Well, I think more important
- 17 than the -- than the label that's been put on it is the
- 18 nature of the -- of the argument that's being advanced,
- 19 and it's a collateral attack, whether it -- whether the
- 20 State choose to call it as part of the appeal. What
- 21 happened in Arizona previously was that it would be --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: So now you are creating a
- 23 different rule. You are saying anything which somebody
- 24 determines is appropriately raised as a collateral
- 25 attack, even if there's been no first review of that

- 1 question, there is no entitlement to counsel?
- MR. CATTANI: Well, I think that's the --
- 3 the logical extension of what this Court announced in
- 4 Finley versus -- Finley and Giarratano, that we -- we've
- 5 drawn this distinction between --
- 6 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I don't think as
- 7 Justice Kennedy says that we ever really considered that
- 8 question in Finley and Giarratano, because we were
- 9 assuming there that all the things had been through the
- 10 appeals process.
- 11 MR. CATTANI: But I guess I'm not certain
- 12 that the timing would -- would make a difference of
- 13 when -- of whether you had a direct appeal first or
- 14 whether the collateral proceeding occurs first. In
- 15 either case the collateral proceeding is a
- 16 non-record-based attack on the conviction as opposed to
- 17 the direct review which is a record-based review of the
- 18 conviction. So that the timing I don't think is as
- 19 important as the nature of what's happening; it's a
- 20 non-record based attack on the conviction.
- 21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, Justice Kagan's
- 22 question indicates that there are States, as you know,
- 23 where on direct appeal they can allow for an evidentiary
- 24 hearing on IAC. And as I understand your answer, is if
- 25 that happens the proceedings that precede the resolution

- of the issue on direct appeal, being probably conducted
- 2 by the same counsel who is taking the direct appeal, can
- 3 be conducted and he can be -- and the counsel, he or she
- 4 can be inadequate in the conduct of those further
- 5 inquiries. That seems to me very strange.
- 6 MR. CATTANI: Well, I don't think we are
- 7 suggesting that would be the desired outcome. And --
- 8 it's simply that drawing the distinction between
- 9 collateral --
- 10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: You are suggesting that
- 11 there is no constitutional right to effective assistance
- of counsel on direct, when he conducts some
- 13 supplementary proceedings. That's very strange.
- MR. CATTANI: I guess the suggestion is that
- 15 it's a collateral, that's a collateral proceeding. If
- 16 you stay the proceeding and go back and address
- 17 ineffective assistance that that would essentially be a
- 18 collateral proceeding.
- 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You mean -- that makes
- 20 no sense to me. That happens quite frequently on direct
- 21 appeal where a variety of issues are raised and the
- 22 court -- the circuit court or the appellate courts send
- 23 it back to trial counsel to develop the record further.
- 24 Your position is every time there is a sending back,
- 25 that stops the need for effective counsel?

- 1 MR. CATTANI: If they've sent something back
- 2 for a new hearing, I think that's something different.
- 3 I think you --
- 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is that involved in this
- 5 case? Do we have to decide this for this case?
- 6 MR. CATTANI: I don't think we need to. I
- 7 think it's clear --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: It's another case. It's --
- 9 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, the reason I think
- 10 it's relevant is that if you were to say that there
- 11 needed to be effective assistance of counsel there, then
- 12 I would have asked you, what is the difference between
- 13 this case and that case? So that's the reason it is
- 14 relevant to this case, because the difference is really
- 15 just one of just labels.
- 16 MR. CATTANI: Well, and that's why I think
- 17 it's more important to -- to assess the inquiry that's
- 18 being done, whether it's a collateral inquiry as opposed
- 19 to whether we are labeling it part of the -- the direct
- 20 appeal or not. And if it is a collateral inquiry, then
- 21 it makes more sense I think to -- to couch it in terms
- 22 of this is a collateral review.
- 23 JUSTICE SCALIA: There seems to me a
- 24 rational line between collateral attack and attack in
- 25 the same proceeding. I don't see anything irrational

- 1 about that. Right?
- 2 MR. CATTANI: Uh --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes!
- 4 MR. CATTANI: Yes, I agree. Yes.
- 5 (Laughter.)
- 6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Would you explain to me
- 7 why don't we consider this adverse boost to your
- 8 proceeding, because this post-conviction proceeding, it
- 9 began -- it began the same time as the direct appeal,
- 10 but it ended before this case became final.
- 11 So it was a first -- it was a first tier,
- 12 because it was decided before the direct appeal.
- 13 MR. CATTANI: Well, it is a first-tier
- 14 collateral attack. I would agree that it's the first
- 15 tier. That's the first time that this issue is raised
- 16 in a collateral attack. But I don't -- I don't think
- 17 that's determinative of the issue here.
- 18 This Court has never -- has never said that
- 19 every claim that can only be raised for the first time
- 20 entitles someone to -- to counsel. And that exception,
- 21 that would -- that would swallow the rule. In Arizona,
- 22 in most States where the types of claims that can be
- 23 raised in post-conviction proceedings are generally
- 24 limited to claims that could not have been raised
- 25 earlier.

- 1 So the rule that Petitioner is seeking
- 2 really would swallow -- the exception would swallow the
- 3 rule that was announced in -- in Finley -- and
- 4 Giarratano.
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 6 No, you've got to listen to the government.
- 7 Mr. Wall.
- 8 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY B. WALL,
- 9 ON BEHALF OF UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE,
- 10 SUPPORTING THE RESPONDENT
- MR. WALL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
- 12 please the Court:
- Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, I want to go
- 14 to your questions about the costs, because there are
- 15 some very real costs here. We live in a world that is
- 16 settled and working. Although this Court has drawn the
- 17 line at the first direct appeal, 47 States, D.C. and the
- 18 Federal Government provide counsel in a first
- 19 post-conviction proceeding, either as a right or in the
- 20 discretion of the trial court as public defender.
- 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: 47 States and the
- 22 Federal Government does?
- 23 MR. WALL: That's right. So there are 18
- 24 States that provide it as a right, 29 States and D.C.
- 25 provide it in the discretion of the trial court and the

- 1 public defender, and the Federal Government obviously in
- 2 the discretion of the district courts. And so what
- 3 Petitioner is doing, by its constitutionalizing that
- 4 area, is shifting resources to a subset of
- 5 ineffectiveness claims.
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, it's pretty --
- 7 it's small comfort to the lawyer who -- declined, who
- 8 doesn't get one, that everybody else does.
- 9 MR. WALL: Mr. Chief Justice, I understand,
- 10 but I think this is an area where States are permitted
- 11 to draw different lines, and what Petitioner is saying
- 12 -- take the Federal system, for example. Petitioner's
- 13 rule would say a Federal prisoner can walk in under 2255
- 14 and by making an allegation of ineffectiveness, of
- 15 either trial or appellate counsel, he is entitled to
- 16 appointed counsel, without even I take it a showing of
- 17 colorableness.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, not if you adopt the
- 19 -- the one proceeding rule that I think counsel for the
- 20 Petitioner was suggesting. He suggested Arizona is one
- 21 of those few States where you could only raise this
- issue on collateral, and therefore you are entitled to
- 23 effective assistance of counsel on that trial. And he
- 24 would stop there, for statistical and for -- reasons,
- 25 for probability reasons, rather.

- 1 MR. WALL: I think that is exactly where he
- 2 would stop. I think it's very difficult to explain why
- 3 his rule doesn't require him to go further, because by
- 4 saying the first tier is not a stage of a case, as this
- 5 Court has always meant it, but it applies claim by
- 6 claim, and lawyers are going to represent you only on
- 7 some claims, and you're -- pro se you will file
- 8 others -- he ends up with two problems.
- 9 One, he has to concede as he does in his
- 10 reply brief and as he did in response to Justice Alito,
- 11 that he is going to say the same thing with regard to a
- 12 lot of other claims that are typically raised in habeas;
- and second, he can't find a limiting principle. Because
- 14 when you come in your second or your third or your
- 15 post-fourth conviction proceeding, and you say all my
- 16 previous counsel has been ineffective, that is also the
- 17 first time that you have been able to say it; and you
- 18 will be making the same claim: I am entitled to have
- 19 one constitutionally competent lawyer argue that my
- 20 trial counsel is ineffective.
- 21 JUSTICE BREYER: What about not going that
- 22 far? What about saying in this case -- in this case,
- 23 Arizona did give him a lawyer. In this case, it was the
- 24 same lawyer. In this case, the proceeding was filed
- 25 prior to the completion of the appeal and ended before

- 1 the completion of the appeal. So for this case, this
- 2 counts as the one round of proceedings, and therefore,
- 3 his client can in fact assert that that single
- 4 individual who was his lawyer was incompetent in those
- 5 proceedings that ended -- didn't end prior to the
- 6 termination of the appeal, ended first?
- 7 MR. WALL: Here's the primary problem with
- 8 that, Justice Breyer. This Court said in Coleman, and
- 9 before that in Murray v. Carrier and in
- 10 Wainwright v. Torna, that if you don't have a Federal
- 11 constitutional right to counsel and the States or
- 12 Congress go beyond what they are constitutionally
- 13 required to do when they give you a lawyer, that
- 14 performance does not thereby give rise to a due process
- 15 claim.
- 16 JUSTICE BREYER: No. but it didn't face the
- 17 issue of what about a claim that you have a
- 18 constitutional right to bring up at least once? And
- 19 this is the first time he was able to bring it up. So
- 20 in other words, Coleman didn't face this problem. It's
- 21 as if you couldn't bring up the claim that the judge was
- 22 sleeping until he got the collateral proceedings. A
- 23 State could have such a rule -- I don't know why they
- 24 would, but they could. But if they did, it would be
- 25 your first chance ever to attack that file process, and

- 1 so isn't Coleman, in its effort to bar relitigation,
- 2 actually rather beside the point?
- 3 MR. WALL: Justice Breyer, I think we just
- 4 see the case in fundamentally different ways. His first
- 5 opportunity to raise his trial's ineffectiveness claim
- 6 was in his first post-conviction proceeding, and he had
- 7 the opportunity to raise it and his lawyer didn't. And
- 8 what he's coming in and saying now is not I was deprived
- 9 of an opportunity to raise it, as in Europe, but I had
- 10 the opportunity and I didn't --
- JUSTICE BREYER: No, we are saying it the
- 12 same way, just as if his lawyer, when he could raise the
- 13 fact that the judge was sleeping, didn't raise it
- 14 because he was staring at the ceiling and had been
- 15 drinking too much. Just as he could raise that point in
- 16 habeas, because it's his first chance to do it, so he
- 17 could raise the point that the lawyer, the first time
- 18 that he had the chance to raise the ineffectiveness of
- 19 trial counsel, was incompetent, et cetera.
- 20 MR. WALL: Justice Breyer, I think this case
- 21 presents a much narrower question, which is, when he
- 22 comes in, in his second post-conviction proceeding and
- 23 says although I didn't raise it last time around, I have
- 24 cause to excuse that default because my lawyer was
- 25 ineffective. This Court's been clear in three different

- 1 cases -- that is only cause if he had a constitutional
- 2 right to counsel in a proceeding that he's pointed to
- 3 and that he complains about. So the question --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What you haven't told me
- 5 is a reason why he shouldn't have had effective counsel
- 6 in the first post-conviction proceeding? I mean, our
- 7 entire line of cases under Douglas were premised on the
- 8 fact that defendants would not be or couldn't be charged
- 9 with the ability to prosecute their claims through
- 10 direct appeal. Discretionary appeal, we said the
- 11 likelihood is they could do it on discretionary appeal
- 12 because they would have a record from below, they would
- 13 have competent counsel below who would make the best
- 14 arguments possible, they could then pursue their
- 15 discretionary appeals because they had something to work
- 16 with.
- But if your first chance is to present
- 18 ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a
- 19 post-conviction proceeding, you have no record to work
- 20 with.
- 21 MR. WALL: That's right. Just so -- I think
- 22 this is a very different case from Douglas and Halbert,
- 23 which were grounded in a fairly fundamental equal
- 24 protection concern, that indigent defendants would be
- 25 denied a first look -- maybe an only look -- at their

- 1 convictions and sentences. Here, we're facing something
- 2 very different. States like Arizona are giving direct
- 3 appeals; defendants are getting looks at their
- 4 convictions and sentences, as petitioner did, they're
- 5 providing post-conviction review.
- 6 JUSTICE KAGAN: But they didn't -- only the
- 7 first --
- 8 MR. WALL: They are even providing lawyers
- 9 in post-conviction review --
- 10 JUSTICE KAGAN: Look at the effective
- 11 assistance claims. So what you say, Mr. Wall, if the
- 12 Stated did the following -- if it said we are going to
- 13 take out all Fourth Amendment exclusion claims and we
- 14 are going to put that in the post-conviction review
- 15 system, and you know what, there, you are not entitled
- 16 to an effective lawyer. Would that be all right?
- 17 MR. WALL: Justice Kagan, I think there are
- 18 any number of claims, that if a State tried to pull them
- 19 out of direct appeal and locate them in collateral
- 20 review, we might be able to say it's then running its
- 21 obligation under Douglas because those are the types of
- 22 claims based on a trial record that ought to be -- and
- 23 always have belonged to direct appeal. The question is
- 24 did the State act arbitrarily when it takes an
- 25 ineffectiveness claim. So the only type of claim that

- 1 the State is trying to relocate into collateral review
- 2 and --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: I'm sure the State would not
- 4 say it was acting arbitrarily in my example. The State
- 5 would say there is a good reason for it, the Fourth
- 6 Amendment exclusion claims are disfavored, they have
- 7 nothing to do with innocence; they involve a kind of
- 8 fact-intensive inquiry that is better done in a
- 9 different proceeding. So I think that the State would
- 10 have many good reasons, but, you know, it's also true
- 11 that there, you don't get a lawyer.
- 12 MR. WALL: Justice Kagan, I just -- I think
- 13 the Court's case law would -- I mean; I think it would
- 14 be a different question; the Court having said that
- 15 under Stone, at least in the Federal system, the Fourth
- 16 Amendment claims can't be raised on habeas because it
- 17 would be difficult for a State to come in and say they
- 18 have to be raised in habeas. Here, the Court said in
- 19 Massaro these claims are best suited to resolution in
- 20 habeas, and they are claims that are traditionally
- 21 brought in habeas. And at least for that type of claim,
- 22 which is the -- I mean, the State's not trying to hide
- 23 the ball here. All the State has done was take a claim
- 24 that this Court has said belongs in habeas and say we
- 25 are putting it in habeas, not in a Federal system where

- 1 although people can raise it as a practical matter,
- 2 they're all decided on collateral review -- virtually
- 3 all of them.
- It says, we are just going to say people
- 5 have trouble briefing and raising it and we will
- 6 relocate it to collateral review, not for ambiguous or
- 7 arbitrary reasons but for all of the reasons that this
- 8 Court gave in Massaro. So at least for that type of
- 9 claim, I think it's permissible under the Fourteenth
- 10 Amendment leaving for another day whether they could do
- 11 it with other types of claims -- that I do think
- 12 probably belong to a direct appeal. And that would
- 13 present very different constitutional problems if a
- 14 State started trying to channel them to collateral
- 15 review, but -- all Arizona has done is pick up on
- 16 Massaro and say absolutely right, these claims belong in
- 17 habeas, and that's where we are going to put them.
- 18 And collateral review --
- 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You have now told me
- 20 that the vast majority of States, 47 I think is the
- 21 number you gave -- put this into post conviction, give
- 22 counsel at post-conviction review. Isn't it an empty
- 23 promise if what you are giving is incompetent counsel?
- 24 I mean, Strickland is a very high standard.
- MR. WALL: Justice Sotomayor, a number of

- 1 States have found under their own constitution or
- 2 statutes a right to effective assistance of counsel.
- 3 But it's a very different matter to say that when States
- 4 go beyond what the Constitution requires in providing
- 5 counsel, that counsel's performance thereby gives rise
- 6 to a due process claim. And again, the courts rejected
- 7 that in at least three cases, and I think saying that
- 8 it's cause to excuse a procedural default here without
- 9 saying that there is some underlying right to counsel
- 10 would require a ruling in those other cases.
- 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- Mr. Bartels, you have two minutes remaining.
- 13 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT BY ROBERT D. BARTELS
- 14 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
- 15 MR. BARTELS: Mr. Chief Justice, let me
- 16 straighten out one thing -- subtly in the record about
- 17 the facts. This is not in the record, and I am doing
- 18 this for my friend's benefit. Harriet Levitt was
- 19 initially appointed to represent Mr. Martinez on appeal.
- 20 She then moved to have herself appointed for purposes of
- 21 a post-conviction review, and it was at a later date,
- 22 not too much later, that she filed the notice. So at
- 23 the time the notice was filed, she was officially
- 24 appointed counsel for purposes of post-conviction
- 25 proceedings, and the Arizona Court of Appeals stayed

1	their proceedings, which were ongoing. There was a
2	notice of appeal to allow it to continue.
3	The other point that I wanted to get to was,
4	the questions about other States where this these
5	claims are handled on direct appeal illustrate a couple
6	of things about our argument: One is, it would be
7	seem very peculiar to say you have a right to appointed
8	and effective counsel in Wisconsin or Utah on these
9	issues, but not in Arizona, where the label that
10	difference is purely label.
11	All these claims, almost all of them,
12	require additional evidence, and that fact makes counsel
13	even more important. Respondents want to say you have a
14	right to counsel on review for almost all claims, but
15	not the one where you need it the most.
16	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
17	The case is submitted.
18	(Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the case in the
19	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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25	

	21:6 22:9 33:19	appeals 1:18	9:19 14:10,11	47:18 48:11
ab 10:25	44:10	3:12 35:6 37:13	14:12,15,20	51:2
ability 47:9	Alito's 7:10	38:10 47:15	16:9,10,18 17:2	Assistant 1:20
able 16:17 19:20	allegation 6:2	48:3 51:25	17:7 18:16,22	assuming 38:9
21:15 44:17	43:14	APPEARANC	24:20 29:20,21	astray 34:1
45:19 48:20	allege 33:16	1:15	30:4,25 31:25	attack 35:17,19
above-entitled	allow 27:19	appellate 4:13	32:10 34:2	35:21 37:19,25
1:12 52:19	38:23 52:2	20:17 21:1,4,16	37:18 42:8	38:16,20 40:24
absence 21:25	allowed 29:13,14	21:19 22:4,6,13	51:13 52:6	40:24 41:14,16
absolutely 10:1	allows 5:15	26:7,22 39:22	arguments 9:20	45:25
10:14 14:4 32:7	ambiguous 50:6	43:15	19:23 47:14	attorney 10:21
50:16	Amendment 5:18	applicable 36:7	Arizona 1:6,16	11:12 26:14
abysmally 23:12	48:13 49:6,16	application 23:4	1:19 3:10,12,16	27:21 28:8
accept 23:13,17	50:10	applies 44:5	5:2 11:3 12:1,9	29:16 34:6,13
accommodate	amicus 1:22 2:11	apply 7:20	12:14 20:2,3	35:14
7:12	42:9	appoint 4:25	24:16 29:12,22	authority 27:13
accomplished	analysis 21:14	10:23,25 11:11	29:24,25 30:6	27:17
30:16	21:23 22:17,18	11:18,25 12:14	35:12 36:12	authorized 27:7
act 48:24	Anders 23:8,14	13:10,13 25:6	37:21 41:21	automatic 4:15
acting 49:4	23:22 24:4,15	25:10 30:6,15	43:20 44:23	24:11
additional 26:1,2	Ander's 28:23	32:9	48:2 50:15	available 6:25
35:2 52:12	announced 38:3	appointed 4:17	51:25 52:9	30:12
address 37:10	42:3	5:7 10:15 13:16	Arizona's 3:17	a.m 1:14 3:2
39:16	answer 12:8	24:17 27:9,11	3:22 19:3	B
adequate 30:1	14:25 18:19	27:21 33:25	asked 12:9 40:12	
31:12,14	28:12 31:10	34:18 35:11	asking 9:3	B 1:20 2:9 8:12
adopt 43:18	38:24	43:16 51:19,20	assert 26:12 45:3	42:8
advanced 25:20	answers 12:13	51:24 52:7	asserted 5:12	back 18:3 27:6
25:22 37:18	anymore 16:8	appointing 30:16	assertion 26:13	37:3 39:16,23
advantage 28:3	appeal 3:13,25	appointment 9:8	asserts 5:12 21:7	39:24 40:1
adverse 41:7	7:16 11:9,14,15	appoints 29:24	assess 40:17	bad 14:8
advised 34:13	12:11 18:22	appropriately	assistance 3:18	balancing 22:18
advocating 15:4	19:4,6,11,19	37:24	4:12,15 5:9,24	22:21 hall 40:22
15:7 24:25	19:21,24 20:5,9	approval 27:14	8:2,9,20 9:5,15	ball 49:23
affidavit 10:22	20:12,14,18,21	arbitrarily 48:24	10:20 14:22	bar 46:1
ago 5:20	21:11,20 27:9	49:4	15:1 19:12,20	Bartels 1:16 2:3
agree 8:4 9:25	27:11 29:9,9,15	arbitrary 50:7	20:8,14,16	2:13 3:5,6,8
20:7 41:4,14	36:22 37:2,5,20	area 43:4,10	22:10,13 23:9	4:21 5:1,5,14
agrees 3:17	38:13,23 39:1,2	argue 8:14 16:11	23:15,20,22	5:25 6:8,16 7:2
Ah 12:20	39:21 40:20	44:19	25:16 26:10,12	7:7,19 8:3,22
ahead 9:20	41:9,12 42:17	argued 23:25	26:23 29:14	9:7,14,22 10:8
Alito 5:10,22 6:1	44:25 45:1,6	arguing 12:17	30:13 32:16,21	10:11,14 11:2
8:8 9:3 14:19	47:10,10,11	15:10,11 19:12	33:16,24 35:14	11:13,20,23
	40.10 72 5 0.1 7	argument 1:13	37:7 39:11,17	12:5,15,18,25
15:8 16:25	48:19,23 50:12 51:19 52:2,5	2:2,5,8,12 3:6	40:11 43:23	13:3,21 14:13

				5
		100		
14:15,23 15:5	Breyer 12:7,16	cases 12:3,4	24:18,22 29:5	52:11,14
15:13,23 16:13	12:20 13:2,6,24	19:25 20:4	42:5,11 43:6,9	clarify 27:7
16:22 17:5,13	14:14,16 15:7	26:13,24 27:4,5	51:11,15 52:16	clear 5:20 14:25
17:16,23 18:2,6	16:1,14,24	28:8 33:1 35:25	choose 37:20	40:7 46:25
18:13,17 19:1	29:19 30:18	36:6,17,17 47:1	circuit 39:22	client 7:17 9:4
19:16,18 20:1,6	31:9,17 32:13	47:7 51:7,10	circumstances	13:14 27:14
20:19,24 21:12	32:18 33:4,8	Cattani 1:18 2:6	8:24 35:4 36:8	45:3
22:12,20 23:6	44:21 45:8,16	24:19,20,22	claim 3:14 5:9,12	client's 27:14
23:18 24:1,5,14	46:3,11,20	25:4,13 26:2,9	6:4 7:15,25 8:9	closely 8:10
51:12,13,15	brief 17:18 23:11	26:18,25 27:4	8:20 9:10,12,12	coincidence
based 9:24 38:20	24:4 25:7 28:21	27:10,18,23	9:16,16,24	30:22
48:22	28:23 34:25	28:6,15 29:1,11	10:20 11:1	Coleman 45:8,20
bases 8:13	44:10	30:9 31:5,15	12:22 13:19,25	46:1
basically 14:12	briefing 50:5	32:11,14 33:2,6	14:2,2,7,22	collateral 12:13
basis 21:5 22:8	briefs 13:8 18:3	33:10 34:4,24	15:8 16:5,20	12:23 15:21
24:7 25:21	23:17	35:5,10,16 36:3	17:1 19:3,14	16:3 17:9 19:10
Batson 9:12,12	bring 7:17,25 9:5	36:9,19 37:8,16	20:22 21:7,18	29:7,24 30:7,23
9:16,24	19:3,14 45:18	38:2,11 39:6,14	22:11 23:10	31:1,22 35:18
began 41:9,9	45:19,21	40:1,6,16 41:2	26:6 29:2 30:6	35:19,21 36:18
behalf 1:16,19	bringing 34:19	41:4,13	30:12,21 31:20	37:10,19,24
1:22 2:4,7,10	broken 4:4	cause 13:5 33:17	31:23 32:22	38:14,15 39:9
2:14 3:7 24:21	brought 49:21	33:20 46:24	33:18,23 36:22	39:15,15,18
42:9 51:14	burdens 11:22	47:1 51:8	41:19 44:5,6,18	40:18,20,22,24
believe 7:8 34:25		caveat 5:15	45:15,17,21	41:14,16 43:22
belong 50:12,16	C	ceiling 46:14	46:5 47:18	45:22 48:19
belonged 48:23	C 2:1 3:1 8:13	certain 38:11	48:25,25 49:21	49:1 50:2,6,14
belongs 49:24	call 37:20	certainly 20:17	49:23 50:9 51:6	50:18
benefit 35:7,11	called 31:1	25:22 27:5	claimed 10:4	colorableness
35:12 51:18	capital 12:3	30:14,17 32:12	claiming 14:6	43:17
best 47:13 49:19	26:13 27:5	33:15 35:2	31:20	come 6:4 9:1
bet 31:25	Carpenter 33:16	cetera 46:19	claims 3:11,19	25:9,12,13
better 21:24 30:9	Carrier 45:9	challenge 11:7	4:12 5:23 8:6	44:14 49:17
34:12 49:8	case 3:4,4,21 4:6	challenging 22:4	8:10,17,21 10:3	comes 10:19
beyond 5:23	5:8 6:7 8:3 13:1	chance 13:15	10:23 19:19	13:12 30:24
31:16 45:12	13:3,11,12 15:4	14:7 45:25	20:14 21:4	46:22
51:4	16:15 17:8 20:4	46:16,18 47:17	22:17 23:20,23	comfort 43:7
billing 10:16	24:2,4 28:8	change 20:7	25:16,17 26:10	coming 46:8
block 13:17	34:14 36:2	24:25 25:3	29:3,14 33:13	competent 44:19
blocked 16:12,20	38:15 40:5,5,8	channel 50:14	34:8,15,19	47:13
32:7,11 33:15	40:13,13,14	charged 47:8	36:14 41:22,24	complains 47:3
blocks 33:1	41:10 44:4,22	CHARLES 1:6	43:5 44:7,12	completion 44:25
board 13:23	44:22,23,24	check 10:25	47:9 48:11,13	45:1
boost 41:7	45:1 46:4,20	Chief 1:18 3:3,8	48:18,22 49:6	complicated 5:2
Brady 6:18 7:10	47:22 49:13	9:9,17 19:8,17	49:16,19,20	concede 44:9
7:25 8:5,5	52:17,18	19:22 20:3	50:11,16 52:5	conceivable 28:4
,			· 	

28:25	1:7	47:18 50:22,23	days 35:1	28:20
concern 47:24	correctly 36:7	51:2,5,9,11,24	dealing 5:19	developing 35:14
concerned 5:8	cost 26:4	52:8,12,14,16	dealt 20:14,17	devoted 17:18
6:12	costs 25:6,8,9,12	counsel's 22:4	decide 29:17	diary 28:18
concerns 32:8	26:1,2 42:14,15	51:5	40:5	dictate 4:5
conduct 39:4	couch 40:21	count 16:8	decided 29:3	difference 38:12
conducted 39:1,3	counsel 1:18	counts 45:2	37:15 41:12	40:12,14 52:10
conducts 39:12	3:14,18,23,25	couple 52:5	50:2	different 11:3
Congress 45:12	4:12,15,16,16	court 1:1,13 3:9	decides 10:22	13:10 16:19
consider 41:7	4:25 5:7,11,17	3:12,15,19 4:11	19:23	18:24 20:21
considered 38:7	5:24 6:6 7:15	4:17,24 5:20	decision 29:12	25:11 26:21
constitutes 13:5	7:16,17,20,21	18:20 20:13	33:14	27:25 35:17
constitution 51:1	7:25 8:2,9,12	23:13 24:7,9,23	decisions 14:24	36:7,25 37:23
51:4	8:14,15,18,20	30:5 32:15	declined 43:7	40:2 43:11 46:4
constitutional	9:3,6,18,23	33:12,14,18	default 14:21	46:25 47:22
25:19 39:11	10:6,16,18,20	35:20 36:20	33:17,21 46:24	48:2 49:9,14
45:11,18 47:1	10:23,25 11:16	37:3,4 38:3	51:8	50:13 51:3
50:13	11:19,25 13:5	39:22,22 41:18	defendant 5:6	difficult 26:11,11
constitutionality	14:22 15:2,9,12	42:12,16,20,25	12:10 23:12	37:8 44:2 49:17
21:10	15:14,17,18,21	44:5 45:8 49:14	29:23 30:2,12	direct 3:12,25
constitutionali	15:24,25 16:2,3	49:18,24 50:8	31:19 34:7,8,11	7:16 18:22 19:4
43:3	16:4,5,16,17	51:25	34:15,22 35:2	19:11,13,19
constitutionally	17:7,9 19:12,14	courts 7:11 10:21	36:21	20:5,9,12,14
44:19 45:12	19:21 20:8,17	24:16 26:16,19	defendants	20:18 21:20
contained 28:18	20:21,22 21:2,4	29:25 39:22	19:15 47:8,24	27:9,11,22 28:5
contest 21:9	21:7,9,16,25	43:2 51:6	48:3	35:21 36:22
context 5:17,19	22:11,14,14,23	Court's 14:24	defender42:20	37:2,5 38:13,17
25:24	22:24 23:9,15	25:1 31:16	43:1	38:23 39:1,2,12
continue 52:2	23:19,20,22	46:25 49:13	delayed 29:9	39:20 40:19
continuing 17:19	24:10,17,18	create 33:2	denied 26:20	41:9,12 42:17
continuum 33:3,5	25:6,10,17,19	creating 37:22	47:25	47:10 48:2,19
convicted 6:2	26:5,7,7,22,22	credible 26:6	Department 1:7	48:23 50:12
12:10	26:22,23 29:13	criminal 1:18	1:21	52:5
conviction 3:11	29:13,23 30:13	3:11 19:15 20:4	deprived 46:8	DIRECTOR 1:6
4:4 8:7,15 11:7	30:15,16 32:16	critical 21:24	described 34:18	disagreement
28:9,21 29:18	32:17,20,21	curiae 1:22 2:11	desired 39:7	22:25
38:16,18,20	33:24 34:1,18	42:9	detailed 10:16	discovered 6:5
44:15 50:21	35:7,11,12,18	current 24:14	determination	6:17 8:1
convictions	37:7,11 38:1	33:15	24:16	discovery 7:10
27:20 48:1,4	39:2,3,12,23		determinative	discretion 42:20
correct 4:21 7:2	39:25 40:11	D 1.16 2.2 12 2.1	41:17	42:25 43:2
16:13 18:1,2	41:20 42:5,18	D 1:16 2:3,13 3:1	determines 4:17	discretionary
20:19 33:10	43:15,16,19,23	8:13 51:13	37:24	47:10,11,15
35:7 36:17	44:16,20 45:11	date 51:21	develop 39:23	disfavored49:6
CORRECTIO	46:19 47:2,5,13	day 50:10	developed 11:17	distinction 4:2,6
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

35:20 38:5 39:8	35:18 37:11	27:3 35:15 44:1	failure 9:24,24	22:1,22 23:25
district 10:21	effort 46:1	example 7:21	fair 11:25 31:19	24:25 26:7,21
43:2	either 30:24	9:11,15 16:23	32:10,23	30:21 37:25
doing 28:3,24	38:15 42:19	22:13 43:12	fairly 47:23	38:13,14 41:11
43:3 51:17	43:15	49:4	far 5:8 22:19	41:11,14,15,19
Douglas 6:21 8:4	Eldridge 21:23	exception 32:19	44:22	42:17,18 44:4
14:25 18:21	eliminate 25:15	32:24,25 33:1	far-reaching	44:17 45:6,19
21:14 22:21,25	Emitz 27:19	41:20 42:2	5:22	45:25 46:4,6,16
23:1 47:7,22	empty 50:22	excessive 6:11	fast 37:4	46:17 47:6,17
48:21	encompass	6:14 25:8	Federal 3:10	47:25 48:7
draw17:25 18:5	19:19	exclusion 48:13	4:19 5:1,6,6	first-tier3:23,24
18:8,15,19	ended4:7 41:10	49:6	6:24 7:1,3,7,11	7:20 9:8 15:14
25:24,25 43:11	44:25 45:5,6	exculpatory 6:3	10:19 14:3	18:15 41:13
drawing 39:8	endless 15:8,12	28:18	26:16,19 30:5	focus 24:24
drawn 18:11,23	ends 44:8	excuse 13:5	32:2 33:11,12	follow 10:4 30:19
18:25 35:21	enslavement	24:10,10,13	42:18,22 43:1	following 36:10
38:5 42:16	23:15	46:24 51:8	43:12,13 45:10	36:11 48:12
drinking 46:15	entire 47:7	experience 10:2	49:15,25	follows 36:13
due 21:23 30:10	entirely 3:17	explain 41:6 44:2	figure 12:4	forever 18:12
30:15 31:7	entitled 5:7	exponentially	file 5:6 19:5 27:8	forget 16:21
45:14 51:6	35:13 36:21	22:7	27:13 28:5,13	form 11:5,5,5
duty 8:23 9:4	37:6 43:15,22	extends 5:23	34:8,16 44:7	12:11,12
24:15	44:18 48:15	extension 25:14	45:25	forth 18:4
D.C 1:9,21 42:17	entitlement 38:1	38:3	filed 44:24 51:22	found 51:1
42:24	entitles 41:20	Extensions 35:3	51:23	Fourteenth 50:9
	equal 47:23	external 33:20	files 28:22 34:6	Fourth 48:13
E	error 21:25	extraordinary	filings 27:19	49:5,15
E 1:18 2:1,6 3:1,1	errors 10:4	36:13	final 19:7 41:10	free 7:13
24:20	errs 36:10	extremely 6:12	find 34:7,14	frequently 29:12
earlier 5:13 6:15	especially 4:6		44:13	39:20
21:8 28:10	ESQ 1:16,18,20	F	finds 7:21	friend's 29:21
41:25	2:3,6,9,13	F 32:12	fine 17:15 31:24	51:18
easy 26:10	essentially 11:11	face 10:22 45:16	finished 28:5	full 13:15 14:6
Edwards 33:16	28:23 39:17	45:20	Finley 11:17 25:2	fundamental
effective 12:18	establishes 9:13	facing 48:1	25:18 35:19	47:23
13:15 14:7 15:1	et 46:19	fact 9:14 12:3	36:12 38:4,4,8	fundamentally
15:25 24:17	Europe 46:9	30:3 33:25 45:3	42:3	46:4
32:16,21 35:13	evaluation 37:4	46:13 47:8	first 3:15 4:3,7	further 29:2 39:4
37:6 39:11,25	everybody 43:8	52:12	4:13,24 6:20	39:23 44:3
40:11 43:23	evidence 6:3,17	factor 21:24	8:7,14 11:12	
47:5 48:10,16	8:1 20:15,15	facts 51:17	12:11,23 13:4	<u> </u>
51:2 52:8	28:17 52:12	fact-intensive	15:15,16,21	G 3:1
effectiveness	evidentiary 27:2	49:8	16:3 17:9,9,25	General 1:21
9:13 15:16,18	38:23	failed 6:3 21:4	18:21 19:5	generally 27:1
21:1,15 22:5	exactly 18:11,22	failing 8:12 26:14	20:25 21:13,21	41:23
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

10.2		0.04.05.40		
getting 48:3	gotten 13:16	26:24 27:10	indication 28:16	25:5
Giarratano 25:2	14:3	38:24 40:2	indigent 47:24	intervals 10:10
25:18 32:12	government 6:24	hearings 27:2	individual 45:4	involve 15:17
35:20 36:12	42:6,18,22 43:1	hide 49:22	ineffective 3:15	49:7
38:4,8 42:4	grant 34:10	high 22:24 50:24	3:18 4:12,14	involved 40:4
GINSBURG 4:9	granted 35:4	historically	5:9,24 8:2,9,12	involves 22:2
4:22 5:4 6:14	ground 14:16	29:13	8:16,20 9:5,11	irrational 40:25
7:14,24 9:2	32:4	hold 5:10 10:23	9:15,21 10:20	irrevocably
23:3,7,21 24:3	grounded47:23	holding 8:3	12:24 13:19	14:21
24:9 34:17 41:6	grounds 11:6	Honor 4:21 5:14	14:5,8,21 15:9	issue 3:21 7:20
give 5:19 14:25	guess 11:23 30:5	6:16 7:3,19	15:22 19:12,20	13:1,2,3,20
16:2,3,17 17:11	30:18 38:11	8:22 9:7,14,22	20:8,13,16,22	16:15,16 21:16
31:2,3,10,11	39:14	10:8,11,14	22:10,13 23:9	23:16 24:12
31:12,12,13,13	<u> </u>	11:23 12:6,25	23:15,20,22	28:9,17 29:7
31:21 32:20		13:21 14:13,23	24:8 25:16 26:8	36:2,18,24 37:3
33:8 44:23	habeas 6:25 7:1	15:13,23 16:22	26:10,12,14,23	39:1 41:15,17
45:13,14 50:21	13:18 14:3,5	17:13,16 18:6	29:14 30:12	43:22 45:17
given 7:4 12:11	16:11,20 20:23	18:17 19:1,18	33:16,23 39:17	issues 7:21 10:9
18:7 34:15	31:25 32:2,2	20:1,24 21:12	44:16,20 46:25	10:13,13 23:24
gives 32:10 34:6	33:12 44:12	22:20 23:6 24:5	47:18	29:18 37:14
34:8 51:5	46:16 49:16,18	huge 11:16	ineffectively	39:21 52:9
giving 16:8,15	49:20,21,24,25	hypothetical	16:18	
48:2 50:23	50:17	7:10 13:23	ineffectiveness	J
go 3:19 4:10 6:25	Halbert 6:21 8:5	т	9:19,23 13:4	JEFFREY 1:20
8:20 9:19 15:15	14:25 21:14	I I	32:22 43:5,14	2:9 42:8
16:6 18:3,12	22:21 47:22	IAC 11:1 38:24	46:5,18 48:25	judge 4:13,13
22:19,19 23:4	hand 36:2	illogical 34:9	infinite 17:19	14:5,9 22:2,6,9
27:6 30:19 34:3	handle 26:16,19	illustrate 52:5	33:3,5	23:4,8,10,11
39:16 42:13	handled 19:24	implicate 25:1	inform 34:19	23:21,23 24:11
44:3 45:12 51:4	35:5 52:5	implicated 26:3	information 6:4	24:15 32:2
goes 16:10 30:14	handles 20:5	implication 6:21	28:19	45:21 46:13
31:15	happen 29:6 32:2	imply 8:5	initial 8:11 11:15	judgment 17:3
going 7:23 11:21	happened 4:8	important 37:16	initially 3:19	judgments 32:5
13:9 14:1 15:17	29:4,11 37:21	38:19 40:17	51:19	jurisprudence
19:19,20,23	happening 38:19	52:13	initio 10:25	25:1
21:3,15,17	happens 10:15	impose 25:8	innocence 49:7	justice 1:21 3:3,8
23:13,17 24:13	12:9 38:25	inadequate 17:7	inquiries 39:5	4:9,18,22,23
25:25 30:5,18	39:20	29:23 30:2 31:3	inquiry 40:17,18	5:4,10,22 6:1
33:5 34:11 37:2	happy 19:9	31:21,24 39:4	40:20 49:8	6:14,23 7:4,9
37:4 44:6,11,21	hard 5:16	incompetent	insistence 3:22	7:14,24 8:8 9:2
48:12,14 50:4	Harlan 23:1,1	45:4 46:19	insofar 32:21	9:3,9,17 10:3,9
50:17	Harriet 51:18	50:23	instance 29:4	10:12,17 11:10
good 16:5 30:22	hear 3:3	incorrect 22:23	interest 11:17,22	11:16,21 12:2,7
30:23 36:24	heard 13:18	indicate 15:8	25:2	12:8,16,20 13:2
49:5,10	hearing 10:24	indicates 38:22	interests 4:18,23	13:6,24 14:14
, -				

				56
14:16,19 15:3,6	15:19 17:2,6,14	leave 17:2	looking 21:16	minutes 51:12
15:7,7,19 16:1	35:23,25 36:5	leaving 50:10	29:2 30:11	missing 13:8
16:14,24,25	36:16 38:7,21	led 34:1	looks 48:3	mistake 22:3
17:2,6,14,23	39:10 43:18	leg 11:12	lose 31:3	motion 27:8,13
18:3,10,14,18	KENT 1:18 2:6	lens 30:10	lot 25:7 32:9	28:5,14
19:8,17,22 20:3	24:20	let's 14:16	44:12	moved 51:20
20:16,20 21:6	kind 5:15 8:25	level 14:24 26:21	lower 22:7	Murray 45:9
22:9,15,25 23:1	22:18 36:25	Levitt 27:7,10,16	LUIS 1:3	
23:1,3,7,21	49:7	28:12 51:18		N
24:3,9,18,22	kinds 32:5	lies 18:4	M	N 2:1,1 3:1
25:4,23 26:4,16	know 12:2,2,4,5	light 6:5	main 4:9	narrower46:21
26:19 27:3,6,12	12:6 14:12 15:3	likelihood 47:11	maintained	nature 26:9
27:21 28:2,11	15:6 16:9 18:4	limitation 6:11	35:22	37:18 38:19
28:22 29:5,19	25:10,24 28:6	7:8	majority 27:5	necessarily
30:18 31:9,17	28:11,15 31:4,9	limitations 7:12	50:20	15:17 28:7
32:13,18 33:4,8	38:22 45:23	17:20	making 8:19	29:16 35:16
33:19 34:17	48:15 49:10	limited 7:16 8:1,4	43:14 44:18	need 20:15 39:25
35:5,15,23,24		8:19 9:8 41:24	MARIANO 1:3	40:6 52:15
35:25 36:5,16	L	limiting 15:11	Martinez 1:3 3:4	needed 28:1
36:23 37:12,22	L 1:6	17:3,11 25:21	19:4 24:2,4	40:11
38:6,7,21,21	label 3:20 37:17	44:13	27:19 34:19	never 14:6,20
39:10,19 40:4,8	52:9,10	limits 15:14	51:19	31:25 33:5,8
40:9,23 41:3,6	labeling 40:19	line 17:25 18:4,5	Massaro 5:3	41:18,18
42:5,11,21 43:6	labels 3:16 40:15	18:5,8,11,15	20:13 36:14,19	new8:14 40:2
43:9,18 44:10	lack 20:15	18:19,23 25:24	36:23 37:14	newly 6:17 7:25
44:21 45:8,16	Laughter 14:18	25:25 40:24	49:19 50:8,16	noncapital 27:4
46:3,11,20 47:4	41:5	42:17 47:7	Mathews 21:22	non-capital 12:4
48:6,10,17 49:3	law 18:23 49:13	lines 43:11	matter 1:12	non-record 38:20
49:12 50:19,25	lawyer8:23 9:17	listen 42:6	16:19 30:7 50:1	non-record-ba
51:11,15 52:16	12:14,17,19,22	litigant 10:19	51:3 52:19	38:16
Justices 42:13	12:23 13:15	litigate 19:6	mattered 23:2	normal 32:5
	14:7 16:8 21:19	26:11 33:18	matters 9:6	noted 36:20
K	22:6 29:25 30:2	litigating 33:13	McKane 18:8	notice 34:6,6
Kagan 17:23	30:6,8,21,22	litigation 17:19	mean 4:11 6:24	51:22,23 52:2
18:3 22:15 25:4	31:2,2,10,12	little 5:2	10:4 17:24	notices 11:9
25:23 35:5,15	31:20,22,23	live 42:15	24:10 39:19	number 11:25
35:24 36:23	33:9 43:7 44:19	locate 48:19	47:6 49:13,22	27:25 35:1
37:12,22 38:6	44:23,24 45:4	logical 25:14	50:24	48:18 50:21,25
40:9 42:13 48:6	45:13 46:7,12	38:3	meant 44:5	
48:10,17 49:3	46:17,24 48:16	long 30:14	meritorious 8:17	0
49:12	49:11	longer4:23	28:9 34:2	O 2:1 3:1
Kagan's 38:21	lawyers 13:10,13	look 14:5,9 16:2	merits 17:17,17	object 3:20
keep 10:6	14:3 23:2 29:6	21:15 24:11	21:18	objection 9:25
keeping 5:16	32:9 44:6 48:8	47:25,25 48:10	met 30:5	obligated 10:25
Kennedy 15:3,6	leads 14:20	looked4:12	minor 25:3	11:11,13
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

obligation 21:9	particular 30:1	pointed 47:2	32:22	31:1 34:11
48:21	36:2	points 24:24	prevented 34:1	37:10 38:14,15
obvious 23:10	parts 4:5 11:14	portion 3:24,25	prevents 15:20	39:15,16,18
26:13	pay 7:23 8:23 9:3	portions 4:3	previous 15:9	40:25 41:8,8
obviously 27:13	10:5	position 4:2,9 5:5	17:7 31:16	42:19 43:19
43:1	pays 10:12	33:13 34:12	44:16	44:15,24 46:6
occurs 38:14	peculiar 52:7	39:24	previously 6:5	46:22 47:2,6,19
October 1:10	pending 19:6	possible 19:19	29:15 37:21	49:9
offered 17:3	people 16:15	47:14	primarily 25:13	proceedings 4:10
office 20:7	50:1,4	post 8:6,14 28:1	primary 45:7	4:14,16 5:13
officially 51:23	perceive 29:6	28:9,20 29:18	principle 15:11	14:4 17:4 20:5
oh 13:18 14:6	percentage 12:5	50:21	17:4,12 18:24	38:25 39:13
15:9	performance	post-conviction	19:2 44:13	41:23 45:2,5,22
okay 14:14 16:8	45:14 51:5	3:16,20,23 4:7	principled25:21	51:25 52:1
16:24 31:11	period 35:3	8:11 11:8,19	prior 29:12 44:25	process 21:23
once 9:13 13:22	permissible 50:9	13:4 15:2,16	45:5	30:10,15 31:7
45:18	permitted 7:14	17:25 18:9 19:5	prisoner 12:10	35:6,9 36:25
ones 17:22	43:10	22:4 23:3 25:15	43:13	37:2,5,13 38:10
ongoing 52:1	person 19:22,24	25:16 26:3,22	pro 10:19 44:7	45:14,25 51:6
opinion 14:11	35:6,10 37:6	27:8 34:10 35:8	probability 22:2	progeny 11:18
opportunity 4:3	petition 34:16	41:8,23 42:19	22:5,23 43:25	promise 50:23
4:24 6:20 8:7	petitioner 1:4,17	46:6,22 47:6,19	probably 7:9	proposing 10:18
21:3,18,20,21	2:4,14 3:7,17	48:5,9,14 50:22	14:2.39:1 50:12	proposition 4:18
34:8,15 46:5,7	3:22 5:11 8:10	51:21,24	problem 18:18	5:23 14:20
46:9,10	8:19,21 15:20	post-fourth	24:7 32:14 33:6	prosecute 27:9
opposed 38:16	24:25 33:20,22	44:15	33:11 45:7,20	27:11 47:9
40:18	42:1 43:3,11,20	potential 11:1	problematic 34:5	prosecution 6:2
oral 1:12 2:2,5,8	48:4 51:14	potentially 28:9	problems 17:19	protection 47:24
3:6 24:20 42:8	Petitioner's	practical 17:20	44:8 50:13	provide 9:18
original 12:8	17:17 43:12	17:21 50:1	procedural 21:23	21:1,9 31:6
ought 48:22	petitions 6:11	practice 29:15	30:10,15 31:7	42:18,24,25
outcome 39:7	27:20	precede 38:25	33:17,21 51:8	provided 6:9
overcome 33:17	Phoenix 1:19	precedent 32:7	procedurally	21:11
33:20	pick 50:15	32:12 33:15	14:21	provides 6:19
	piece 32:3	prejudice 21:17	procedure 34:5	22:8 24:7
P	place 18:14,24	prejudicial 22:3	34:18 36:10	providing 48:5,8
P 3:1	36:11	premised 47:7	procedures	51:4
page 2:2 16:23	pleading 34:9	present 8:7	30:11	public 42:20 43:1
pages 17:18	please 3:9 24:23	47:17 50:13	proceed 12:12	pull 48:18
paper32:3	42:12	presented 3:15	proceeding 3:16	purely 52:10
papers 26:20	pleases 18:8	presents 46:21	4:7 5:15 6:9,19	purposes 51:20
pardon 26:18	point 4:24 5:13	presumably	8:11,15 15:21	51:24
36:1	7:12,17 13:14	19:13	17:10 18:1	pursue 7:22
part 20:8 37:5,12	35:3 46:2,15,17	pretty 43:6	19:13 25:15	24:12 34:20
37:20 40:19	52:3	prevent 27:24	26:3 30:23,25	47:14
			<u> </u>	<u> </u>

				0
pursuing 9:15,16	ramifications	relevant 40:10	24:21 42:10	52:7,14
put 37:17 48:14	4:19	40:14	Respondents	rise 45:14 51:5
50:17,21	rare 36:20	reliance 11:17	52:13	risk 21:24 22:1
putting 36:25	rarely 22:17	11:22 25:2	response 44:10	road 33:21
49:25	rational 40:24	relief 3:11,16,20	rest 11:15	ROBERT 1:16
p.m 52:18	rationale 36:6	8:11,13 11:8	result 22:23 27:1	2:3,13 3:6
	read 32:3	27:8 28:10	review3:24,24	51:13
Q	real 42:15	34:20 36:21	4:1,4 5:21 6:19	ROBERTS 3:3
question 9:2 12:8	really 7:4 11:6	relieve 32:8	6:20 7:20 9:8	9:9,17 19:8,17
13:13 14:2	11:14 22:25	relitigation 46:1	9:12 12:13,23	19:22 20:3
16:19 28:12	25:20 36:13	relocate 49:1	15:14,17 16:3	24:18 29:5 42:5
30:20 31:7	38:7 40:14 42:2	50:6	18:16,21 19:10	43:6 51:11
33:19 35:13	reason 10:23	remaining 35:1	21:1,3,18,20	52:16
36:5 37:9 38:1	21:13 28:4,7,7	51:12	22:22 23:22	Ross 14:25
38:8,22 46:21	28:12,24,25	remains 34:23	27:22 28:5 29:7	round 12:11,21
47:3 48:23	40:9,13 47:5	remand 37:2,6	29:24 30:7 31:1	16:6 45:2
49:14	49:5	reply 44:10	31:22 35:9,18	routine 29:5
questions 30:20	reasons 36:24	represent 8:21	35:21 37:25	routinely 10:15
42:14 52:4	43:24,25 49:10	9:4 44:6 51:19	38:17,17 40:22	11:18,25 25:17
quite 17:18 39:20	50:7,7	representation	48:5,9,14,20	26:17,20 34:14
	REBUTTAL	10:6 21:10	49:1 50:2,6,15	35:4
R	2:12 51:13	represented	50:18,22 51:21	rule 15:4,10
R 3:1	recall 34:24 35:1	23:12	52:14	25:14,21 28:5
raisable 3:12	receive 35:7	representing	reviewing 29:17	28:13 37:23
raise 4:24 7:15	received 27:15	7:17 27:18,24	reviews 23:11,21	41:21 42:1,3
8:11 9:11,19,20	35:11	33:22	ridiculing 13:25	43:13,19 44:3
13:20 16:4	receives 35:12	request 12:1	right 3:22,25	45:23
19:10,10 20:12	recognized 20:13	35:2	4:10,15 5:11,17	rules 6:11 27:19
21:4,19 23:8,16	37:14	require 4:18,23	5:18 6:6,22 7:6	ruling 51:10
26:10,12,15	recommended	11:6 21:17	7:19 8:19 10:18	run 7:9 11:3
28:17 29:8,14	36:14	25:15 44:3	12:16,22 13:6	running 48:20
30:12 36:1,1	record 27:7	51:10 52:12	14:1 15:1,8,12	Ryan 1:6 3:4
43:21 46:5,7,9	28:16 29:17	required 9:18	15:24,24 16:14	Kyan 1.0 3.4
46:12,13,15,17	35:14 39:23	45:13	16:21 18:16	S
46:18,23 50:1	47:12,19 48:22	requirement	20:18,23 21:6	S 2:1 3:1
raised 6:15 7:15	51:16,17	3:18 33:18	23:4,19 24:4,17	satisfying 30:15
21:8 28:1 29:7	record-based		25:17,19 29:8	saw 27:25
29:18 33:23	38:17	requires 9:16 51:4	29:19 30:8 31:4	saying 8:18,22
36:18,22 37:24				11:11 13:18
39:21 41:15,19	regard 44:11	resolution 38:25	31:6,9 32:15,16 32:20 35:15	14:1 15:20
41:23,24 44:12	regular 35:6	49:19		17:24 18:11,19
49:16,18	37:13	resolved 29:10	39:11 41:1	22:22 27:16
raises 26:23	rejected 25:17	resources 43:4	42:19,23,24	37:23 43:11
raising 32:22	51:6	respect 3:23 5:8	45:11,18 47:2	44:4,22 46:8,11
34:2 50:5	related 8:10	Respondent 1:19	47:21 48:16	51:7,9
	relating 36:15	1:23 2:7,11	50:16 51:2,9	31.7,7
	1	1	I	1

				61
says 9:3 10:19	12:12	start 14:16	stop 7:6 43:24	49:15,25
11:7 16:7 28:23	simply 9:18 27:9	started 4:7 50:14	44:2	
30:24 34:13	39:8	state 3:10 4:5	stops 39:25	T
38:7 46:23 50:4	single 45:3	5:15,21 6:8,8,9	straight 6:25	T 2:1,1
SCALIA 6:23	situation 5:1 6:17	6:10,19,23,25	straighten51:16	tactical 28:3,7
7:4 10:3,9,12	6:18 8:25 9:23	7:22 8:6,23	strange 39:5,13	take 13:22 20:21
20:16,20 40:4,8	22:22 25:11	9:18 10:5,12,15	strategic 28:13	43:12,16 48:13
40:23 41:3	34:12	10:24 11:11,13	28:24,25	49:23
se 10:19 44:7	Sixth 5:18	13:12,17 16:3,6	Strickland 50:24	takes 48:24
second 12:21	sleeping 45:22	18:7 20:25 21:8	strict 6:12	talk 25:7 33:14
15:2,22,25	46:13	25:5 26:21	structure 37:15	talking 8:25
17:11 21:3,13	small 43:7	30:24 31:21	submit 10:16,21	12:20,21 17:10
21:17,19 25:15	Solicitor 1:20	33:14,18,25	submitted 52:17	24:1
26:3,5 27:7	solution 7:5	36:6 37:1,15,20	52:19	Tempe 1:16
30:22 34:10	somebody 20:4	45:23 48:18,24	subset 43:4	termination 45:6 terms 21:13
44:13,14 46:22	30:17 32:1	49:1,3,4,9,17	substance 4:8	40:21
secured 26:5	37:23	49:23 50:14	substantive 11:6	40:21 terrible 13:16
see 14:6 28:23	someplace 18:20	Stated 48:12	subtly 51:16	Thank 24:18
40:25 46:4	18:25	statements	succeed 22:17	42:5 51:11
seek 27:14	somewhat 34:9	10:16	sufficiently	52:16
seeking 42:1	sorry 8:8 9:9	states 1:1,13,22	22:24	theoretical 14:24
send 39:22	14:17 16:7	2:10 7:5,13	suggested 43:20	17:18
sending 39:24 sense 4:11 11:4	22:14 23:13	11:2,18,22,25	suggesting 39:7 39:10 43:20	theoretically
29:8 33:4 39:20	34:25 Setemover 10:17	12:6 13:10 20:11 25:10		18:7
40:21	Sotomayor 10:17 11:10,16,21	32:8 37:1 38:22	suggestion 39:14 suited 49:19	theory 10:24
sensible 18:14	12:2,8 26:4,16	41:22 42:9,17	sunted 49.19 summary 24:6	15:14 25:19
sensibly 4:4	26:19 27:3,6,12	42:21,24,24	supplementary	35:22
sent 40:1	27:21 28:2,11	43:10,21 45:11	39:13	thing 7:6 20:10
sentences 48:1,4	28:22 39:19	48:2 50:20 51:1	supporting 1:23	44:11 51:16
sentencing 26:14	42:13,21 47:4	51:3 52:4	2:11 6:4 42:10	things 5:16 7:18
set 7:11 36:7	50:19,25	State's 25:2	suppose 36:25	11:24 20:24
settled 42:16	sounded 13:25	49:22	supposed 16:4	37:15 38:9 52:6
sheets 10:6	Spanish27:16	stating 11:6	Supreme 1:1,13	think 5:18 6:20
shift 33:11	speak 27:16	statistical 43:24	sure 36:9 49:3	7:2 9:1,3,7 11:2
shifting 32:14	specific 34:24	statistics 22:16	Surely 9:12	14:24 15:23
43:4	speech 23:8,14	27:1	surprising 30:3	16:22 21:22
short 35:3	spotted 23:23	statute 7:8,9,12	sustainable 26:6	23:2,18 25:13
shot 31:19 32:10	Spreitz 29:12	statutes 6:10	swallow41:21	25:20 26:9 27:5
show33:23	stage 44:4	51:2	42:2,2	27:23 29:3,8
showing 43:16	stand 4:6	stay 29:15 39:16	system 4:20 5:2	30:9 31:5,15,18
shuttle 35:8	standard 50:24	stayed 51:25	5:6 7:3,7 10:15	32:11 33:2 34:4
significant 24:25	standpoint 31:6	sticking 22:12	10:19 19:2,9,15	34:9 35:16,17
silly 14:10	stands 18:23	sticks 26:1	24:15 26:21	35:17,19,20
simple 11:5	staring 46:14	Stone 49:15	43:12 48:15	36:3,10,19 37:9
	<u> </u>	l	l	I

27 10 16 20 2 6	22.5.0.1.1.4	122.12	120 17	
37:10,16 38:2,6	22:5,9,11,14	untethered33:13	wanted 28:17	Y
38:18 39:6 40:2	23:4,7,11,20	unusual 29:16	52:3	Yeah 16:24
40:3,6,7,9,16	24:6,7,9,11,15	unworkable	wants 7:22 8:10	years 5:20 6:1
40:21 41:16	26:23 29:6,22	19:11	12:22 30:2,19	
43:10,19 44:1,2	29:23 30:1,13	upheld 24:16	Washington 1:9	Z
46:3,20 47:21	30:22 31:20	urging 4:14,19	1:21	zealously 9:4
48:17 49:9,12	32:23,24 33:24	usual 20:4	Wasn't 27:8	zero 14:17
49:13 50:9,11	35:18 37:3,3,11	usually 19:13,24	way 11:3,8,15	1
50:20 51:7	39:23 42:20,25	Utah 52:8	30:14 37:13,15	
thinking 32:4	43:15,23 44:20	$\overline{\mathbf{v}}$	46:12	10-1001 1:5 3:4
thinks 29:23	46:19 48:22	-	ways 11:3 27:25	100 5:20 13:16
third 44:14	trial's 46:5	v 1:5 3:4 21:23	30:13 46:4	102 14:3,3
thought 13:7	tried48:18	33:16 45:9,10	went 33:21	11:05 1:14 3:2
23:11 28:1 29:1	tries 30:20	valid 23:23	we're 7:22 25:25	12-minute 10:10
30:1	trouble 50:5	variety 39:21	48:1	12:06 52:18
three 24:24	true 20:2 49:10	various 10:9	we've 6:17 38:4	18 42:23
46:25 51:7	Try 35:24	vast 50:20	wherewithal 18:7	19 13:18,19 14:8
threshold 9:19	trying 49:1,22	versus 38:4	win 14:1 31:25	2
tier 15:15 18:21	50:14	viable 23:16	33:5	2011 1:10
21:13,14 22:22	Tuesday 1:10	victim's 28:18	winning 14:11	2255 4:10,14,16
26:7 41:11,15	turn 6:3 17:21	view4:25 13:14	Wisconsin 52:8	4:22 5:7 8:6
44:4	two 4:3,5 11:24	16:16 18:15	wish 7:13	43:13
time 5:16 10:6	13:22 20:24	30:4 32:7	wished 5:6	24 2:7
22:1,3 34:17,22	44:8 51:12	viewed 30:10	withdrawing	24-B 11:5
34:23,25 35:2,3	type 23:8 34:12	views 28:8	36:24	29 42:24
36:12 39:24	48:25 49:21	violation 6:18	won 33:24	2) 42.24
41:9,15,19	50:8	7:11	wondering 22:15	3
44:17 45:19	types 19:25	virtually 50:2	25:7,9	3 2:4
46:17,23 51:23	41:22 48:21	W	words 45:20	32 27:13 28:5,13
timing 38:12,18	50:11	Wainwright	work 10:17,18	
told 47:4 50:19	typically 44:12	45:10	19:2 47:15,19	4
tolerable 29:3	<u> </u>	walk 43:13	working 42:16	4 1:10
34:7,14		Wall 1:20 2:9	works 9:10 21:23	42 2:10
Torna 45:10	Uh 41:2	42:7,8,11,23	world 42:15	47 42:17,21
track 5:16	unable 34:7,14	43:9 44:1 45:7	worrying 32:9	50:20
traditionally	underlying 51:9	46:3,20 47:21	worse 19:15	
49:20	understand 6:16	48:8,11,17	wouldn't 4:10,20	5
transcript 24:6	9:10 12:7 13:7	49:12 50:25	5:24 6:6 8:1	51 2:14
treat 11:14	15:19 17:8	want 5:10 8:14	23:12,13	
trial 3:14,15,18	18:10 27:15	9:5 12:12 14:11	wrong 16:12 22:6	
3:19 4:13 5:9	38:24 43:9	15:3,6 17:14	22:6,10 32:6	
5:17,19,24 8:12	understood	29:20 30:21	36:17	
8:16 9:25 10:5	17:24	31:4 34:20	X	
14:7,9 15:18	United 1:1,13,22	42:13 52:13		
16:5 19:24 22:2	2:10 42:9	12.13 32.13	x 1:2,8	
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	I	<u> </u>